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Law and Financial Development: What We Are
Learning from Time-Series Evidence
John Armour, Simon Deakin, Viviana Mollica, and Mathias Siems
ABSTRACT
The legal origins hypothesis is one of the most important and
influential ideas to emerge in the social sciences in the past decade.
However, the empirical base of the legal origins claim has always been
contestable, as it largely consists of cross-sectional datasets, which provide
evidence on the state of the law only at limited points in time. There is
now a growing body of data derived from techniques for coding crossnational legal variation over time. This time-series evidence is reviewed
here and is shown to cast new light on some of the central claims of legal
origins theory. Legal origins are shown to be of little help in explaining
trends in the law relating to shareholder protection, although the
classification of legal systems into English-, French-, and Germanorigin “families” has greater explanatory force in the context of creditor
rights. The widely-held view that increases in shareholder rights foster
financial development is not supported by time-series analyses. More
generally, the new evidence casts doubt on the suggestion that legal
origins operate as an “exogenous” force, independently shaping both the
content of laws and economic outcomes. It is more plausible to see legal
systems as evolving in parallel with changes in economic conditions and
political structures at national level.
 John Armour is at the University of Oxford, Simon Deakin is at the University of
Cambridge, Viviana Mollica is at Queen Mary, University of London, and Mathias Siems is at
the University of East Anglia. The work reported here was carried out at the Centre for
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project (http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/research/programme2/project2-20.htm). We gratefully
acknowledge funding from the ESRC’s “World Economy and Finance” Program, the Newton
Trust, the EU Sixth Research and Development Framework Programme (Integrated Project
“Reflexive Governance in the Public Interest”), and the Oxford-Man Institute of Quantitative
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I. INTRODUCTION
Many scholars believe that legal institutions matter for financial
development. According to the “legal origins” hypothesis developed
by La Porta et al. and their collaborators (“LLSV”),1 legal systems
vary considerably in the way they regulate economic activity. A
principal cause of this diversity is the role played by the different
legal traditions or “origins” of the common and civil law.2 Some
argue that countries in which legal systems have a common law
origin emphasize the protection of private property, whereas those
with civil law roots favor an activist role for the state.3 These legal
differences seem to have tangible economic effects. Common law
systems have been found to have more dispersed share ownership,4
more liquid and extensive capital markets,5 and more highly
developed systems of private credit6 than civilian ones. In part
through the Doing Business reports of the World Bank,7 these
findings have come to influence policy reform in “dozens of
countries” over the past decade.8 Reforms to corporate and
bankruptcy law have seen a strengthening of shareholder and
creditor rights, particularly the former.9
Influential as it is, the legal origins hypothesis has raised more
questions than it has answered. The idea that a country’s approach to
the regulation of the economy is fixed at the point when it first
adopts or has imposed upon it, through colonization or conquest, a
certain type of legal order, implies that national systems are locked
1. The acronym “LLSV” refers to the four authors of the first legal origins papers:
Rafael La Porta, Francisco Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny. See the
references to their work, infra.
2. Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, The Economic
Consequences of Legal Origins, J. ECON. LITERATURE 46, 285 (2008) [hereinafter La Porta et
al., 2008].
3. Edward Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, Legal Origins, 117 Q.J. ECON. 1193, 1194
(2002).
4. Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Corporate
Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471, 471 (1999).
5. Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Law
and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113, 1135–37 (1998) [hereinafter La Porta et al., 1998].
6. See generally Simeon Djankov, Carelee McLiesh & Andrei Shleifer, Private Credit
in 129 Countries, 84 J. FIN. ECON. 299 (2007) [hereinafter Djankov et al., 2007].
7. WORLD BANK, DOING BUSINESS REPORTS (various years), available at
http://www.doingbusiness.org.
8. La Porta et al., 2008, supra note 2, at 325.
9. See infra, Part IV.
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into particular developmental paths. This neglects the possibility of
feedback effects between legal change and economic development. It
also points to a potential contradiction in the use of the legal origins
hypothesis to generate policy reforms: the common law model, while
apparently more conducive to financial development, might not be
appropriate for transplantation into civil law regimes. What is at stake
here is the degree of fit between substantive rules and the legal
structures said to underpin them. Adherents of the legal origins
hypothesis suggest that legal changes can be undertaken “without
disturbing the fundamentals of the legal tradition” of the countries
concerned,10 a view supportive of the move to align civilian systems
with the common law approach.
A further issue is whether the postulated relationship between
legal rules and economic outcomes is as tight as has been suggested.
A central methodological tenet of the legal origins approach is that
legal rules can be coded and the extent of cross-national legal
diversity quantified as a preliminary step to testing for the economic
effects of certain laws. Scholars first developed the legal origins
hypothesis in the context of a legal coding exercise which showed
that legal protection of outside investors against the threat of
expropriation by corporate insiders was consistently higher in
common law countries than in civil law ones. Econometric analysis
was then used to show that “legal investor protection is a strong
predictor of financial development,”11 as measured by the level of
stock market activity and the degree of dispersion of share
ownership.12 Although the scope of the legal origins claim has since
been extended to cover a number of other areas of law and
regulation, it is this early work on the relationship between law and
finance, as subsequently extended and developed,13 that has proved
most influential on law reform. Yet the empirical basis for this
finding is limited; it mostly depends on cross-sectional data on the
10. La Porta et al., 2008, supra note 2, at 325.
11. Id. at 286.
12. La Porta et al., 1998, supra note 5.
13. See generally Djankov et al., 2007, supra note 6; Simeon Djankov, Oliver Hart,
Caralee McLeish & Andrei Shleifer, Debt Enforcement Around the World (ECGI Finance,
Working Paper No. 147, 2007); Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes
& Andrei Shleifer, The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing, 88 J. FIN. ECON. 430 (2008)
[hereinafter Djankov et al., 2008]; Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei
Shleifer, What Works in Securities Laws?, 61 J. FIN. 1 (2006) [hereinafter La Porta et al.,
2006].
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laws of countries in the late 1990s, with no systematic coding of
legal change over time.
A decade after the publication of the first legal origins studies, we
can now subject the legal origins hypothesis to tests that measure its
validity as an instrument of policy in the areas of law and finance. In
this paper we present time-series evidence of trends in corporate and
bankruptcy law in a sample of twenty-five developed, developing,
and transition systems over the period 1995 to 2005. We put this
information in the context of a more in-depth study of five countries
(France, Germany, India, the United Kingdom, and the United
States) over a thirty-six year period, 1970 to 2005. The evidence
from the longitudinal datasets that we report here reveals the farreaching nature of the legal changes that have occurred over these
periods, and in particular the last decade. There has been a consistent
rise in levels of shareholder protection evident most clearly in the
civil law systems, which have been catching up with their common
law counterparts. In the area of creditor rights, there has been a less
dramatic change. Nevertheless, a significant overall increase in
protection has occurred, which is particularly marked in transition
systems. In short, we see the effects of a process of legal alignment
around the idea of legal support for financial development of the
kind promoted by the World Bank14 and given intellectual support
by the legal origins hypothesis.15
We find, however, that legal convergence has not been translated
into financial development of the kind predicted by the legal origins
approach, or at least not yet. Econometric analyses that we report
here indicate that legal changes of the kind we have tracked have not
been reflected in increased levels of stock market activity. We explore
why this might be by looking at a number of explanations. One is
that laws which might be well suited for the liquid capital markets
and dispersed ownership structures of the common law world (in
particular Britain and America) are not working as intended in civil
law and developing systems where those conditions do not prevail.
Another is that the enactment of shareholder rights on the scale that
we have seen over the past decade could have been
counterproductive, in common law and civil law systems alike.

14.
15.
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Our paper aims to make three contributions to the legal origins
literature. Our first is theoretical: we show that there are difficulties
in viewing the legal system as an entirely “exogenous” influence on
the economy and that it may be more useful to see legal systems as
both shaping and being shaped by economic and political factors, an
approach we label “coevolutionary.” Our second aim is
methodological: we demonstrate how the coding and measurement
of legal rules can be undertaken on a longitudinal basis and how the
resulting data can be used in conjunction with time-series and paneldata econometric techniques to throw light on the direction of
causation in the relationship between legal and economic change.
Our third aim is normative, in the sense of evaluating how far
evidence and analysis of this kind could or should be used to inform
the process of legal reform.
Part II below provides an overview of legal origins theory,
emphasizing the way in which the theory has developed in response
to empirical findings and to certain critiques. In Part III we take a
closer look at methodological issues and explain the “leximetric” and
econometric techniques that we employ to study legal change and its
interaction with economic variables. Part IV presents our main
findings and Part V offers a theoretical reevaluation of the legal
origins hypothesis in the light of this new empirical evidence. Part VI
concludes.
II. LEGAL ORIGINS: THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN EVIDENCE AND
THEORY
A. Explaining Legal Origins
The legal origins literature began with a series of empirical
findings requiring explanation; only gradually did a theory emerge
that aimed to provide a systematic account of these results. As noted
above, the earliest legal origins studies focused on the relationship
between legal protection of investor interests and financial outcomes
including ownership structure and capital market development.
LLSV’s “antidirector rights”16 index contains six principal indicators
of shareholder protection: the extent to which the corporate law of a
given system allowed voting by proxy; whether the law prevented the
blocking of voting and other rights associated with share ownership
16.

La Porta et al., 1998, supra note 5, at 1127–28.
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prior to a shareholders’ meeting; whether it contained a “cumulative
voting” rule that allowed for representation of minority shareholder
interests on the board; whether it provided legal mechanisms, such as
derivative suits, available to minority shareholders to protect against
“perceived oppression by directors”; whether it provided for
shareholders’ preemption rights in respect of new share issues,
thereby preventing the dilution of stakes; and the extent of voting
rights required to call a shareholders’ meeting. Two further
indicators, referring respectively to the one-share-one-vote rule and
laws on mandatory dividends, were used in some of their analyses.
They found, on the basis of legal data collected for forty-nine
countries in the mid-1990s, that low scores on the index were
associated with a high concentration of ownership and a low level of
stock market development as measured by the ratio of stock market
capitalization to GDP.17 These relationships were especially strong in
French civil law systems, justifying the conclusion that “legal systems
matter to corporate governance and . . . firms have to adapt to the
limitations of the systems that they operate in.”18
This first “law and finance” paper proved to be extraordinarily
influential in demonstrating the possibilities of quantitative legal
analysis. It produced a clear empirical finding with far-reaching
implications for policy debates. In subsequent studies, researchers
tried new methods for coding the law, with the focus on the
operation of legal rules in a series of hypothetical cases. Evidence was
gathered from surveys of practicing lawyers in a range of countries.
Researchers adopted this different approach to address some of the
criticisms of the early studies. In particular, the new methods, by
drawing on survey evidence from legal practitioners, were intended
to incorporate evidence concerning the enforcement of legal rules
and to avoid undue subjectivity in the coding process. On this basis,
a second wave of results essentially confirmed the findings of the
early studies: there was a clear divide between the common law and
the civil law with respect to rules on self-dealing in corporate
transactions,19 prospectus disclosure,20 and creditor rights.21 These
legal differences were reflected in financial outcome variables,
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
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including, in the context of creditor rights, the size of private debt
markets.22 The common law-civil law divide also operated in related
areas of economic life, such as labor regulation23 and rules on
business start-ups.24 The divide also had consequences for
unemployment and employment levels, the size of the informal
economy, and the level of corruption. In addition, a set of studies
looked at aspects of legal institutions including the flexibility of court
procedure25 and the extent of judicial independence;26 these
institutional variables appeared to correlate with contract
enforcement and the protection of property rights.27
These findings “raise[d] an enormous challenge of
interpretation.”28 What has emerged from the iteration of theory and
evidence over the past decade is a claim that it is not so much legal
rules themselves that matter, as the infrastructure of the legal system.
“Legal infrastructure” refers to the meta-level rules, norms, and
practices that determine, in a given national context, the mechanisms
for law making and dispute resolution, the competencies of
legislatures and courts, and the conception of the role of government
in the economy and society, among other things. In this broad sense,
“legal origin” is not confined to formal legal institutions but may
extend to include informal norms and shared assumptions about the
prevailing “style of social control of economic life.”29 The civil law
“style” is “associated with a heavier hand of government ownership
and regulation than the common law” and, as a result, with “greater
corruption, larger unofficial economy, and higher unemployment.”
The common law, by contrast, “is associated with lower formalism of
22. See generally id. It should be noted that while there is some evidence that financial
development indicators, such as the extent of stock market capitalization and private credit, are
correlated with overall levels of economic growth as measured by GDP, it has not proved
possible to find a link between legal origins as such and GDP growth. See La Porta et al., supra
note 2, at 301–02.
23. See generally Juan Botero, Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-deSilanes & Andrei Shleifer, The Regulation of Labor, 119 Q.J. ECON. 1340 (2004).
24. See generally Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes &
Andrei Shleifer, The Regulation of Entry, 117 Q.J. ECON. 1 (2002).
25. See generally Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes &
Andrei Shleifer, Courts, 118 Q.J. ECON. 453 (2003).
26. See generally Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Cristian Pop-Eleches &
Andrei Shleifer, Judicial Checks and Balances, 112 J. POL. ECON. 445 (2004).
27. The evidence is summarized by La Porta et al., 2008, supra note 2, at 293–98.
28. Id. at 286.
29. Id.
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judicial procedures and greater judicial independence than civil law,”
and hence with “better contract enforcement and greater security of
property rights.”30
The persistent influence of legal origin is the result of the
tendency of the legal system, in the first instance, to operate as a
mechanism for the stabilization of norms and practices. Legal
institutions promote particular routines, conventions, and
distributional compromises, which can be understood as providing
solutions to various collective action problems and related issues of
societal coordination. As such, they display the characteristics of
lock-in and path-dependence, which are associated with the
development of formal institutions:
[T]he reason for persistence is that . . . beliefs and
ideologies become incorporated in legal rules,
institutions, and education and, as such, are
transmitted from one generation to the next. It is this
incorporation of beliefs and ideologies into the legal
and political infrastructure that enables legal origins
to have such persistent consequences for rules,
regulations, and economic outcomes.31
Legal systems also allow for the transmission of norms and
practices across different regulatory spaces. Apart from a few
“parent” systems (such as England, France, and Germany), most
countries have had the basic features of their legal systems imposed
upon them by colonization or conquest. When this kind of
transplantation occurred at various points in the period from the late
eighteenth to the early twentieth century, it was not just “specific
laws and codes” that were transmitted, but “more general styles or
ideologies of the legal system,” along with “individuals with mothercountry training, human capital, and legal outlook.”32 Over time, the
national laws of particular countries might have “changed, evolved,
and adapted to local conditions,” but “[e]nough of the basic
transplanted elements have remained and persisted to allow the
classification [of systems] into legal traditions.”33 This is the basis for
30.
31.
32.
33.
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the suggested division of the legal systems of the world into four
principal groupings, namely English or common law, and the
French, German, and Scandinavian variants of civil law.34
A key feature of this theorization of the law-economy
relationship is the claim that legal origin operates as an exogenous or
independent force influencing the path of economic development
(see Figure 1). As just stated, legal origins theory acknowledges that
local economic conditions may, to some degree, shape legal rules in
a given national context. To that extent, there is mutual feedback
between law and economy, and the direction of causation runs both
ways. Thus, legal origins theory can accept the possibility that many
features of modern corporate law regimes can be explained by the
particular types of business enterprise that prevailed in certain
countries at important points in their development, or that trends in
the regulation of financial markets were driven by the emergence of
particular types of financial transactions. It can also accommodate the
idea that the emergence of interest groups prepared to lobby for laws
of a given type, or to litigate particular disputes, in the corporate
field as elsewhere, may have been an important influence on the
content of these laws.35 What is suggested, however, is that these
feedback effects do not reach back to the core legal infrastructure of
the country concerned. The core legal infrastructure is unchanging,
or at least very slow to change by comparison to both the legal rules
themselves and to the wider economic and social environment: “The
legal system supplies the fundamental tools for addressing social
concerns and it is that system . . . with its codes, distinctive
institutions, modes of thought and even ideologies, that is very slow
to change.”36

34. Id. at 288–90.
35. See generally John Coffee, The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law in the
Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1 (2001) (arguing that the United States’
dispersed ownership system of corporate governance is more susceptible to political interest
groups than the concentrated ownership system of countries like Germany); Brian R. Cheffins,
Does Law Matter? The Separation of Ownership and Control in the United Kingdom, 30 J.
LEGAL STUD. 459 (2001) (discussing the impact of political interest groups on the United
Kingdom’s form of the dispersed ownership system).
36. La Porta et al., 2008, supra note 2, at 307.
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—————————————————————————————
Figure 1: Legal origin as an exogenous influence on legal rules and
the economy

Legal origin

Legal rules

Economic
outcomes

—————————————————————————————
In Figure 1, substantive legal rules provide the “channel”
through which legal origin shapes economic outcomes. Legal rules
may not, however, be the only such channel. Legal origins theory
raises the possibility that, independent of the content of rules,
judicial style and modes of enforcement more generally influence the
economy. Empirical research demonstrating a link between the
quality of judicial enforcement of creditor rights and the flow of
private credit supports this suggestion.37 Another possible channel is
provided by the interpretative rules, which courts follow when
construing and enforcing contracts. Common law judicial style is, it
is argued, more flexible in responding to new types of financial
transactions, a flexibility which “promotes financial development” by
legitimizing transactional innovation.38
B. The Complexity of Legal Origins
A potential line of criticism of the explanation given by LLSV for
their legal origins findings is that the broad-brush descriptions they
provide of common law and civilian regulatory “style” are
overstylized to the point of being inaccurate. The law and finance
literature assumes that a clear distinction can be drawn between
systems by reference to their membership in one of the four main
legal families. The reason for choosing this classification is not
explained in detail. Some general references are made to the
mainstream comparative law literature,39 suggesting that this

37. Id. at 299.
38. Id. at 300.
39. The following sources constitute this mainstream literature: RENÉ DAVID & JOHN
E. C. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY (3d ed. 1985); KONRAD
ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW (3d ed. 1998); THOMAS
H. REYNOLDS & ARTURO A. FLORES, FOREIGN LAW: CURRENT SOURCES OF CODES AND
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distinction is well established and uncontroversial. However, modern
comparative law scholarship barely recognizes the global
classifications and generalizations of the law and finance literature.
On a general level, three degrees of criticism can be
distinguished. First, some legal scholars doubt whether even the
distinction between “common law” and “civil law” can be justified
from a historical perspective.40 Second, others accept the idea of two
different legal origins as a historical starting point but emphasize
that, since the end of the twentieth century, legal systems are
becoming international, transnational, or even global in nature, so
that the idea of a strict common law-civil law divide is an
anachronism.41 Third, even those comparative lawyers who still apply
the notion of legal families emphasize the limits of this concept,
stating that it is really no more than a didactic device.42
More specifically, the law and finance literature overlooks the
difficulties involved in classifying many countries as either common
law or civil law in origin. The idea that the laws and legal institutions
of the parent systems have simply spread to other parts of the world
disregards the ongoing influence of pretransplant laws, the mixtures
and modifications that occur at the moment when copying of foreign
law occurs, and the posttransplant period in which the transplanted
laws and institutions may be altered (or at least applied differently
than in the parent system).43 Examples of this are plentiful. For
example, the law and finance literature assumes that the transition
economies of Eastern Europe are either German or French legal
origin countries, whereas in practice they have been influenced by a
number of different traditions. Similarly, it is assumed that Japan,
LEGISLATION IN JURISDICTIONS OF THE WORLD (1989).
40. Stefan Vogenauer, An Empire of Light? Learning and Lawmaking in the History of
German Law, 64 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 481, 483 (2005); Reinhard Zimmermann, Savigny’s Legacy
Legal History, Comparative Law, and the Emergence of a European Legal Science, 112 L.Q.
REV. 576, 588 (1996).
41. See, e.g., Mathias Reimann, Beyond National Systems: A Comparative Law for the
International Age, 75 TUL. L. REV. 1103, 1115 (2001); Jaakko Husa, Classification of Legal
Families Today—Is it Time For a Memorial Hymn?, REV. INT. DR. COMP. 11 (2004).
42. DAVID & BRIERLEY, supra note 39, at 21 (“[I]t is no more than a didactic device.”);
ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 39, at 72 (“[A]ny division of the legal world into families is a
rough and ready device. It can be useful for the novice, by putting the confusing variety of
legal systems into some kind of loose order, but the experienced comparatist will have
developed a ‘nose’ for the distinctive style of national legal systems . . . .”).
43. Mathias M. Siems, Legal Origins: Reconciling Law & Finance and Comparative
Law, 52 MCGILL L.J. 55, 70 (2007).
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South Korea, and China are German legal origin countries, whereas a
more nuanced analysis would have to take into account the
indigenous legal cultures of these legal systems as well as more recent
Anglo-Saxon influence. Further, classifying countries such as Iran,
Saudi Arabia, and Yemen as simply “common law” in origin
underplays the role of religious legal traditions.44
A counterargument to the one just made could be that the law
and finance literature is specifically concerned with the rules that are
relevant for “doing business.” Here, it is indeed the case that the law
of developed countries has had a discernible influence on most
African, Asian, and Latin American legal systems. Yet, in these areas
of law it is difficult to justify using the suggested distinction between
English, French, German, and Scandinavian legal origins. Formally,
at least, case law is the primary source of law in common law
jurisdictions, whereas in civil law jurisdictions, codes and related
legislation constitute the primary source of law. However, the
sources of corporate law, securities law, and bankruptcy law are
mainly statutory across the world, even in common law countries.45
This is not to say that we should not expect to find some
similarities among countries regarded as belonging to the same legal
family. Countries of the same legal origin often share a common
language. For example, if Spain amends its corporate law, it is more
likely that this reform will diffuse to the Spanish-speaking countries
of Latin America than to the Anglophone world.46 Certain countries
have developed a shared legal heritage due to coordinated efforts to
develop common solutions to legal problems and to systematize the
exchange of legal information, as in the case of the Scandinavian
systems.47 It is not necessary to invoke legal origin as an explanation
for these trends.
Harmonization of laws and the borrowing of legal concepts and
rules from foreign systems may also go on across legal families,
particularly in the field of law and finance. There is a long tradition

44. See id. at 62–70.
45. See, e.g., Priya P. Lele & Mathias M. Siems, Diversity in Shareholder Protection in
Common Law Countries, 5 J. FOR INSTITUTIONAL COMPARISONS 3, 5 (2007).
46. See Holger Spamann, Contemporary Legal Transplants—Legal Families and the
Diffusion of (Corporate) Law, 2009 BYU L. REV. (forthcoming 2009); Mathias M. Siems,
Shareholder Protection Around the World (“Leximetric II”), 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 111, 138, 142
(2008).
47. See ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ , supra note 39, at 281–83.
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in commercial law of legal transplants, often driven by international
trade, to the extent that commentators have questioned the
relevance of a strict division between legal families.48 Some studies
suggest that by the end of the nineteenth century the most
important features of corporate law were already relatively uniform
across countries.49
Legal origins theorists have responded to points such as these by
conceding that most national legal systems contain hybrid elements,
in part as a consequence of the borrowing or voluntary acceptance of
regulatory solutions on a cross-country basis. Thus it is accepted that
most of securities law, for example, is statutory even in common law
systems, and that this is an area of law that was introduced relatively
recently in “response to perceived social needs.”50 However, the
suggestion is then made that laws of this kind “took different forms
in countries with different legal traditions, consistent with broad
strategies of how the state intervenes.” In America and Britain, the
response to the crisis of the 1930s was “to rehabilitate and support
markets, not to replace them,” while in civil law countries it was “to
repress . . . or to replace [the market] with state mandates.”51 It is
thus claimed that legal origin shapes the way in which different
systems respond to common crises and new social needs.
The “exogeneity” of the legal infrastructure with regard to
economic development is not simply an incidental feature of legal
origins theory. It would be hard to maintain the view that the legal
origins effect, apparently identified in the empirical studies, is not a
proxy for something else without it. This view, in turn, justifies the
use made of legal origins theory to promote institutional reform.
Because legal origin locks systems into particular institutional
configurations, inefficiencies can result, in particular in the
developing world: “[m]any developing countries today find
themselves heavily overregulated in crucial spheres of economic life,
in part because of their legal origin heritage.”52 While common law

48. Detlev Vagts, Comparative Company Law—The New Wave, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR
DRUEY, 595, 598–99 (2000).
49. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89
GEO. L.J. 439, 439–40 (2001); see also MATHIAS M. SIEMS, CONVERGENCE IN
SHAREHOLDER LAW 17–22 (2008).
50. La Porta et al., 2008, supra note 2, at 308.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 287.
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rules are not “always”53 the most efficient, the default position of
legal origins theory appears to be that common law solutions are
generally to be preferred to civilian ones, not least because the right
response to persistent legal inefficiencies “is simply less government
intervention.”54 Civilian responses are seen as desirable only in a
context of extreme crisis and disorder, in which markets break down
completely.55 The deregulatory reform agenda associated with the
Doing Business reports of the World Bank56 is claimed to be a natural
offshoot of legal origins theory on this basis.57
C. Endogeneity and Coevolution
The emergence of “legal origins theory” as a response to the
challenges raised by empirical research on law and development has
provided a sounder conceptual foundation for this line of research
and has clarified certain aspects of the claims being made. The legal
system continues to be at the center of the analysis, but the idea of
legal origin has been broadened to include elements of belief
systems, ideologies, and social norms, as well as more formal legal
institutions. Some limitations of the use of the concept of legal
families have been acknowledged, while the underlying value of the
division of systems along English, French, German, and Scandinavian
lines has been reasserted. The exogenous causal influence of legal
infrastructure remains, with a reduced role for substantive legal rules
in shaping economic outcomes, as alternative channels (enforcement
and interpretation) have been proposed.
The critical issue in addressing the legal origins approach at a
theoretical level is, therefore, the question of law’s “exogeneity” with
regard to the process of economic development. Notwithstanding
the mediation of the effects of legal infrastructure through various
channels, the direction of causation can run only one way, from legal
origin to the economy. The theory is asymmetrical in its treatment of
the legal and economic systems. It requires us to believe that there is
some factor that renders the core of the legal system immune from

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
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economic influence but which does not prevent the legal system
from shaping the economy.
One alternative is to reverse the arrow of causation so that law is
shaped by economic or political forces. This is by no means an
implausible position; on the contrary, it is one with a long history in
certain strands of the sociological and economic analyses of law.
Moreover, it appears to be widely accepted, if not always explicitly
acknowledged, in the social sciences more generally.58 A good reason
for not taking this view, however, is that it would represent
something of a step back in the conceptualization of the laweconomy relation. The legal origins literature, at the least, has done
enough to demonstrate that the legal system should be treated as a
causal variable in its own right, with the capacity to shape economic
outcomes. To this extent at least, we share the claim that “legal
systems matter” with the founders of the legal origins approach. We
disagree, however, with the characterization of the legal system (or,
at least, that part of it that can be characterized as “legal
infrastructure”) as entirely exogenous with regard to the economy.
In proposing that law is better thought of as, at least in part,
“endogenous” to the economy, we are not arguing that either legal
rules or the “legal infrastructure” are predetermined by economic
forces. The claim, rather, is that the dynamic of interaction between
law and the economy is one of “coevolution,” as opposed to linear,
unidirectional change.59 The legal system is, to a certain degree,
autonomous from economic relations, and its development is not
simply dictated by technological or organizational requirements, or
by changes in the composition of supply and demand; legal concepts,
processes, and routines form the immediate material from which new
solutions are fashioned.60 Nevertheless, the economy forms part of

58. For a review of theories that view legal rules as “epiphenomenal,” that is, as a
secondary form or expression of “material” social and economic relations, see Geoffrey M.
Hodgson, The Enforcement of Contract and Property Rights: Constitutive Versus Epiphenomenal
Conceptions of Law, 13 INT. REV. SOC. 375 (2003).
59. The concept of coevolution has roots in evolutionary biology, game theory, and
systems theory, and is increasingly applied to explain the evolution of economic and legal
institutions. See, e.g., M ASAHIKO M. A OKI , TOWARD A COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL
ANALYSIS (2001) (describing evolutionary game theory); G UNTHER TEUBNER , L AW AS AN
AUTOPOIETIC S YSTEM (1993) (describing systems theory). A full account of these theories,
and an assessment of the possibilities for synthesis between them, is beyond the scope of this
paper.
60. On this “self-referential” aspect of legal evolution, see TEUBNER, supra note 59.
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the context within which legal rules evolve, with pressures for
selection being applied by the external environment.61 These
propositions can all be reversed: economic relations evolve, in part,
by reference to an institutional context set by the legal system, and
the same point applies, mutatis mutandis, if the political system is
included in the model (see Figure 2).62
—————————————————————————————
Figure 2. Coevolutionary model of the legal, economic and political
systems

Legal system

Economy

Political
system

—————————————————————————————
Most scholars of corporate law would accept that there is a link
of some kind between the emergence and development of the
business enterprise in industrial societies, and the evolution of legal
forms, associated with the joint stock company, which have served
the needs of entrepreneurs and investors. There is considerable
disagreement, however, on the question of whether legal change

61. On the application of the “Darwinian” evolutionary mechanisms of variation,
inheritance, and selection to legal change, see TEUBNER, supra note 59, at 51. See generally
Simon Deakin, Evolution for Our Time: A Theory of Legal Memetics, 55 CURRENT LEGAL
PROBS. 1 (2002).
62. The incorporation of political economy considerations into the study of institutions
is a core feature of the “Varieties of Capitalism” approach. See Peter A. Hall & David Soskice,
An Introduction to the Varieties of Capitalism, in VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM : T HE
INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF C OMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE (Peter A. Hall & David
Soskice eds., 2001). And it is a core feature of Mark Roe’s “political” theory of corporate
governance. M ARK J. ROE, P OLITICAL D ETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE G OVERNANCE:
P OLITICAL CONTEXT, CORPORATE I MPACT (2003).
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preceded financial development, or the converse. In the context of
the legal origins debate, there is a growing literature looking at the
evolution of corporate law in Britain, France, Germany, and the
United States in the course of the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries.63 One strand of this work argues that financial
development in Britain preceded by several decades the passage of
laws for shareholder protection, while other studies emphasize that
functional equivalents to corporate law,64 such as stock exchange
rules, were already providing a basis for the dispersion of ownership
and control in the late nineteenth century.65 A plausible
interpretation of this historical evidence is that “shareholder rights
have improved enormously in Britain over the course of the
twentieth century, parallel to the growth of its markets.”66 The logic of
coevolution, or mutual influence between law and the economy,
better describes this process than does one of linear adjustment of
the law to economic imperatives, or vice versa.
It is important to stress that a “coevolutionary” conception of
legal change does not predict seamless adjustment between the legal
and economic systems. It is possible that they will be out of sync
with each other for prolonged periods and that, as a result, legal
institutions will very often be imperfectly matched for the economic
goals they purport to serve. Indeed, insofar as legal concepts are
functional, they may well be functional with regard to past
environments rather than those in which they currently operate.67
The efficiency of institutions also needs to be judged in context;
particular rules may be more or less efficient depending on the

63. See Naomi R. Lamoreaux & Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, Legal Regime and Contractual
Flexibility: A Comparison of Business Organizational Choices in France and the United States
During the Era of Industrialization, 7 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 28 (2005); Leslie Hannah, The
“Divorce” of Ownership from Control from 1900 Onwards: Re-Calibrating Imagined Global
Trends, 49 B US. HIST . 404 (2007).
64. Cheffins, supra note 35.
65. See generally Hannah, supra note 63.
66. La Porta et al., 2008, supra note 2, at 321 (emphasis added).
67. See Deakin, supra note 61, at 12–13.
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presence of complementary institutions alongside which they have
evolved.68 Thus,
it may not be accidental that codetermination in the
corporate governance domain and social democratic
corporatism in the polity domain coevolved in
Germany, while the main bank system, the lifetime
employment system, and the close alliance between
industrial associations and relevant administrative
bureaux coevolved in Japan, both in contrast to the
so-called Anglo-American model.69
It has been suggested that institutional theories should be
evaluated by how well they address two core problems:
the synchronic problem, whereby the goal is to
understand the complexity and diversity of overall
institutional arrangements across . . . economies as an
instance of multiple equilibria of some kind, and the
diachronic problem, whereby the goal is to
understand
the
mechanism
of
institutional
evolution/change in a framework consistent with an
equilibrium view of institutions, but allowing for the
possibility of the emergence of novelty.70
Legal origins theory provides answers to these questions, which are
in various ways incomplete or unsatisfactory. Its answer to the
“synchronic problem” is that cross-national diversity results from the
inherited effect of the transplantation of legal orders. This is
potentially a good answer if seen as a partial explanation for diversity,
but not if seen as excluding other possible causes, which are derived
from cross-national differences in modes of business organization
and political organization. Its answer to the “diachronic problem” is
that systems, for the most part, are locked into particular

68. See Reinhard H. Schmidt & Gerald Spindler, Path Dependence, Corporate
Governance and Complementarity, 5 INT’ L FIN . 311 (2002); Beth Ahlering & Simon Deakin,
Labor Regulation, Corporate Governance and Legal Origin: A Case of Institutional
Complementarity?, 41 L. & SOC . R EV . 866 (2007).
69. AOKI, supra note 59, at 17.
70. Id. at 2–3 (emphasis omitted).
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developmental paths, which are the consequence of their legal origin.
This lock-in effect is largely detrimental to economic development in
the civil law context and largely positive in the common law one.
Some movement towards more efficient rules, which legal origins
theory tends to identify with convergence on common law practice,
may be achieved through the benchmarking of national regulatory
regimes by international institutions, including the World Bank.
From a coevolutionary perspective, this view is deficient in not
allowing for the possibility that legal institutions in civilian systems
may be well matched to local economic conditions—or at least as
well matched as in common law systems—thanks to mutual feedback
with local economic conditions, and to the institutional
complementarities to which this gives rise.71 If that is the case,
attempts at convergence that take the common law systems as a
model of best practice are likely to be either ineffective or
counterproductive.
We now turn to a consideration of how empirical analysis, in
particular using quantitative methods, can throw light on these
questions.
III. METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES IN THE QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
OF LAW
The initial legal coding exercises carried out by LLSV have been
criticized on a number of grounds, including errors in the values
attributed to certain specific legal rules and bias in the selection of
variables.72 We do not want to go over this ground again, as it is well
known and has to some degree been taken on board by LLSV in
their more recent empirical analyses.73 Instead, our aim is to set out
71. See ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 39, at 39–40 (suggesting that “different legal
systems give the same or very similar solutions, even as to detail, to the same problems of life,
despite the great differences in their historical development, conceptual structure, and style of
operation,” an argument applied specifically to the manner in which “developed nations meet
the needs of legal business”).
72. See Sofie Cools, The Real Difference in Corporate Law Between the United States and
Continental Europe: Distribution of Powers, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 697 (2005); Holger Spamann,
On the Insignificance and/or Endogeneity of La Porta et al.’s ‘Anti-director Rights Index’ under
Consistent Coding (ECGI Law, Working Paper No. 67, 2006); Holger Spamann, ‘Law and
Finance’ Revisited (Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center, Discussion Paper No. 12,
2008); Udo Braendle, Shareholder Protection in the USA and Germany—On the Fallacy of
LLSV (German Working Papers in Law and Economics, Paper No. 18, 2006), available at
http://www.bepress.com/gwp/default/vol2006/iss1/art18.
73. See La Porta et al., 2008, supra note 2.
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the basis for our own approach to coding, which principally differs
from that of LLSV in providing a longitudinal measure of legal
variation across systems. We set out below some of the
methodological issues encountered in coding the law (“leximetrics”)
and in using time-series and panel-data econometric techniques to
analyze the resulting legal data.
A. Index Construction: Selection of Variables, Countries, and Time
Periods
All legal indices involve the reduction of a complex institutional
reality to a summary form, which allows for statistical analysis. The
choice of variables, the method of defining indicators, and the
algorithms or protocols used for the coding of the legal rules should
each reflect the purpose for which the dataset is constructed. In the
case of the datasets we are considering here, the aim of the analysis is
to clarify the nature of the relationship between legal and economic
change and, more specifically, to examine the impact of law on
financial development and vice versa. Accordingly, we have
constructed datasets that aim to provide an account of how well
different legal systems protect certain shareholder and creditor rights.
Our guiding assumption in each case is that legal rules are capable of
facilitating commercial transactions by reducing agency costs and
other frictions in relations between corporate actors. Our
shareholder protection indices therefore measure how far legal rules
protect external shareholders against the risk of expropriation by
managers and boards, on the one hand, and dominant blockholders
or majority shareholders, on the other, principally in the context of
listed companies. The creditor protection indices measure the extent
to which aspects of corporate and bankruptcy law rank claims and
allocate liabilities between different groups of shareholders and
creditors, both while the company is a going concern and in the
event of insolvency. The selection of the variables of interest in each
case was guided by the comparative law principle of “functional
equivalents,” according to which different legal systems may achieve
the same end or goal through different means, depending on local
contexts and conditions.74 By including, as far as possible, variables
that reflect different legal approaches and traditions, we hope to
minimize the risk of “home-country bias” or the tendency to take
74. See ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 39, at 39.
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the law of one particular country or set of countries as a model or
benchmark, thereby distorting the results.75
LLSV’s antidirector rights index covered forty-nine countries and
some of their later datasets extended to almost one hundred.76
Covering as many countries as possible is desirable from the point of
view of ensuring a comprehensive or representative sample.
However, the more countries that are coded, the greater the risk that
the choice of variables or the definition of the indicators will be
inappropriate for some of them. There is also a potential trade-off
between the breadth and depth of coverage. For these reasons, we
proceeded to construct our indices in two stages.
In the first stage, we created datasets based on extensive indices
for a small number of countries over a lengthy time period. This
allowed us to examine certain countries in depth. We chose countries
not because they were representative, but because of their intrinsic
interest as “parent” systems (France, Germany, and the United
Kingdom), its status as the world’s largest and arguably most
influential economy (the United States), or its status as the largest
democracy by population (India). The period studied was over three
decades long (1970-2005), enabling us to chart trends in legal
change across a number of economic cycles and major political
watersheds, including the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989. Our fivecountry shareholder protection index contains sixty indicators, and
the corresponding creditor protection index has forty-four. As the
laws are coded once for each year, we have (60 + 44) * 36 * 5 =
18,720 observations in these two datasets.77
75. For critiques along these lines, see supra note 72; see also Erik Berglöf & ErnstLudwig von Thadden, The Changing Corporate Governance Paradigm: Implications for
Transition and Developing Countries (Stockholm School of Economics, Working Paper No.
263, 1999); John Armour, Brian R. Cheffins & David A. Skeel, Jr., Corporate Ownership
Structure and the Evolution of Bankruptcy Law: Lessons from the United Kingdom, 55 VAND. L.
REV. 1699 (2002); Mathias M. Siems, What Does Not Work in Comparing Securities Laws: A
Critique on La Porta et al.’s Methodology, INT’L COMPANY & COM. L. REV. 300 (2005);
Mathias M. Siems, Numerical Comparative Law: Do We Need Statistical Evidence in Order to
Reduce Complexity?, 13 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 521 (2005); Priya P. Lele & Mathias
M. Siems, Shareholder Protection: A Leximetric Approach, 7 J. CORP. L. STUD. 17 (2007).
76. See, e.g., the labor regulation dataset described by Botero et al., supra note 23.
77. In addition, we have constructed a labor regulation dataset for the same five
countries and thirty-six-year period. For accounts of this dataset, analysis of which is beyond
the scope of the current paper, see Simon Deakin, Priya Lele & Mathias Siems, The Evolution
of Labour Law: Calibrating and Comparing Regulatory Regimes, 146 INT’L LAB. REV. 133
(2007); John Armour, Simon Deakin, Priya Lele & Mathias Siems, How Do Legal Rules
Evolve? Evidence from a Cross-Country Comparison of Shareholder, Creditor and Worker
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In the second stage, we constructed datasets for a wider range of
developing, developed, and transition systems—twenty-five in all—in
each case using a reduced-form index and covering a more limited
time period, 1995 to 2005. This was a period during which most
countries were liberalizing their economies and adjusting their
regulatory frameworks with a view to promoting private-sector
activity and the globalization of markets. It was also a time of
sustained economic growth for most systems, although with some
interruptions and shocks, including the Asian financial crisis in 1997
to 1998 and the bursting of the dotcom bubble in 2000 to 2001.
Our reduced-form indices for shareholder and creditor protection
contain ten variables each, so that we have (10 + 10) * 11 * 25 =
5,500 observations. Because they contain fewer variables, they do
not capture the same range of information as the extended indices
for the five-country studies. While covering broadly the same areas of
law as the five-country datasets, they also address what we consider
to have particularly salient legal issues relating to shareholder and
creditor protection in the decade after 1995. For example, the
twenty-five country shareholder protection dataset focuses on change
in certain corporate governance standards, such as the presence of
independent directors on boards and the mandatory bid rule in
takeover bids, which were widely associated with global “best
practice” in this period, and which were incorporated in relevant
international standards such as the OECD’s corporate governance
Principles.78
B. Coding the Law
Our approach to coding has been informed by some of the same
methodological considerations that influenced our selection of
variables. We have thus taken into account the variety of different
legal techniques available to legislators, ranging from mandatory
norms to default rules of different kinds. In order to capture the
differing degrees of bindingness implied by these techniques, we use
graduated variables with scores between 0 and 1 in appropriate cases,
rather than simple binary codings. We also code not just for
“positive” legal rules, but for standards found in “soft-law” sources
such as corporate governance codes, stock exchange rules, and
Protection, 57 A M . J. COMP . L. 579, 579–630 (2009).
78. OECD P RINCIPLES OF CORPORATE G OVERNANCE (2004).
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takeover codes.79 Market participants often regard standards of this
type as having the same binding effects as laws, and legislators often
defer to industry-level self-regulation on the understanding that
resort to statutory solutions may be possible if self-regulatory norms
prove to be ineffective.80
C. Illustrations: The Twenty-Five Country Indices for Shareholder and
Creditor Protection
The definitions of the variables, the coding protocols, the values
arrived at through the process of coding, and the detailed legal
explanations for these values are available online for each of our
datasets.81 A previous paper82 has set out in detail the basis for the
coding of the laws in the five-country datasets. To illustrate our
methodology we will focus here on the content of the twenty-fivecountry indices for shareholder protection83 and creditor protection,
and on the way in which the codings were determined in two
particular cases, those of the United Kingdom (for shareholder
protection) and France (for creditor protection).
1. The twenty-five country shareholder protection index
The first variable, powers of the general meeting for de facto
changes, relates to the ability of the shareholders as a collective body
to control actions by the board that may substantially alter the
company’s business profile. The corporate laws of many countries
require transactions that exceed a threshold based on a proportion of
the company’s net assets to be approved by the shareholders. If there
is no such threshold, a score of 0 is given. If there is a restriction
triggered at a threshold of 50% or lower, then a score of 1 is given. If
there is a restriction, but it is triggered at a net asset threshold that is

79. See ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 39, at 39.
80. See Lele & Siems, supra note 75, for discussion of this point in the context of the
coding of the shareholder protection index.
81. See http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/research/programme2/project2-20.html (homepage of the “Law, Finance and Development” project on the Cambridge Centre for Business
Research website).
82. Armour et al., supra note 77.
83. The index used to construct the twenty-five-country dataset is also described (more
briefly) in John Armour, Simon Deakin, Prabirjit Sarkar, Mathias Siems & Ajit Singh,
Shareholder Protection and Stock Market Development: An Empirical Test of the Legal Origins
Hypothesis, 6 J. E MPIRICAL L EGAL S TUD . 343, 343–81 (2009).
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higher than 50% (e.g. 80%), then a score of 0.5 is given. In the UK,
the Listing Rules, which apply to publicly traded firms, specify that
any transaction involving more than 25% of the company’s net assets
must be approved by the shareholders; this rule was present for the
entire period 1995–2005.84 Hence, a score of 1 is given for each
year.
The second variable, agenda setting power, relates to the ability of
a minority shareholder to have an item put on the agenda for a
shareholders’ meeting. The higher the minimum percentage required
to have an item put on the agenda, the lower the coded score. For
the entire period, the United Kingdom’s Companies Act of 1985
stipulated that a shareholder with 5% or more of the voting rights
could have an item put on the agenda for a shareholder meeting.85
This yields a coding of 0.5 for each year in the period under study.
Our third variable, anticipation of shareholder decision, seeks to
capture the extent to which the legal regime facilitates participation
in shareholder decision making by those who are unable physically to
be present at the meeting. This can be done either by permitting
postal voting, or by allowing shareholders to appoint a proxy to
represent them in voting at the meeting. Proxy mechanisms can,
however, be biased in favor of the board of directors unless the
proxies are “two-way”—that is, they provide for voting both for and
against the resolution in question. Moreover, we assume that proxy
facilities are more useful to shareholders when accompanied by a
“proxy solicitation”—namely, a circular explaining the background
to the particular resolutions in relation to which proxy appointments
are sought. In the UK, the Listing Rules required that a two-way
proxy form be circulated to shareholders for the entire period under
consideration, but there was no requirement that it be accompanied
by a proxy solicitation.86 Hence, we code the UK as 0.5 for the
entire period.
Fourth, we consider whether, and if so, how readily, multiple
voting rights are permitted—or, put the other way around, whether a
one-share-one-vote rule is applied. Multiple voting rights facilitate
the aggregation of control in the hands of shareholders with less
than equivalent cash-flow rights, and correspondingly disenfranchise

84.
85.
86.
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UK Listing Rules § 6.3.4 (1984); UK Listing Rules § 10.37 (1993).
Companies Act, 1948, § 140; Companies Act, 1985, §§ 376, 377.
UK Listing Rules § 5.36 (1984); UK Listing Rules § 13.28(a), (b) (1984).
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shareholders who do not share the enhanced voting capability. In the
UK, there has been no legal or other regulatory prohibition of
multiple voting rights for the period under consideration, meriting a
score of 0.87
Our fifth variable relates to the proportion of independent board
members—that is, those who must be free of employment or
ownership links to the firm. Independent directors are widely
thought to be able to assist shareholders in controlling the actions of
managers. We give a score of 1 for jurisdictions in which more than
50% of the board must be independent; a score of 0.5 for
jurisdictions in which more than 25% but less than 50% must be
independent; and 0 for no requirement relating to independence.
For intermediate positions, the score is derived as the percentage of
independent board members divided by two. In the UK, the
Cadbury Code of Corporate Governance, introduced in 1992,
required listed companies to ensure that at least a majority of their
nonexecutive directors be independent. As, at that point, typically
half the board would be nonexecutive directors, we code this as
0.25. The Combined Code of Corporate Governance 2003 raised
the threshold, requiring that at least half of all the board members be
independent. We therefore code the UK as 1 from the following year
(2004) onward.88
The sixth variable relates to the feasibility of directors’ dismissal—
that is, how readily shareholders may remove board members from
their positions. The highest score of 1 is given where directors may
be dismissed by shareholders at will, and 0 is given where dismissal
may only be effected for cause or an important reason (specified in
the law). Intermediate scores are given where although directors may
be dismissed at will, this may be accompanied by a financial penalty
for the company. Such penalties would be higher where there is no
limit to the duration of service contracts, for which a score of 0.5 is
given, and lower where there is a fixed duration, for which a score of
87. On the admissibility (in principle) of multiple voting rights, see Bushell v. Faith,
[1970] A.C. 1099. Multiple voting rights are rarely observed in UK listed companies, but this
appears to be the result of a widely observed social norm, which reflects institutional investor
opinion on the issue, rather than any legal rule.
88. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE, THE CODE OF BEST PRACTICE § 2.2 (1992) (majority of nonexecutive
directors must be independent); FINANCIAL REPORTING COUNCIL, COMBINED CODE ON
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § A.3.2 (2003) (at least half the board members must be
independent).
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0.75 is given. Turning to the UK application, no restrictions were
imposed on shareholders’ ability to remove directors from office
during the study period, but it was possible for directors to enter
into service contracts with the firm that contained termination
payments, thereby subjecting the company to financial liability. From
1992 to 1995, these were subject to a restriction under the Cadbury
Code on Corporate Governance to the effect that the general
meeting had to approve any service contract for more than a threeyear term. In 1995, this was reduced to an outright restriction on
notice periods of more than one year.89 The position is thus one in
which dismissal is fundamentally straightforward, with the possibility
of a financial penalty that is capped by the length of the notice
period. We code this variable as 0.75 for 1995, and then, to reflect
the reduction in the maximum notice period, 0.875 for the
remainder of the study period.
Seventh, we consider the ability of minority shareholders to
bring an action to enforce breaches of directors’ duties—that is, the
extent to which private enforcement is facilitated. Here we code as 0
those laws which exclude the possibility of a shareholder suit, 0.5
where there are some restrictions—such as a requirement that the
shareholder holds some minimum proportion of the voting rights—
and 1 where such an action may be brought readily. In the UK, a
minority shareholder action does not depend on having a minimum
share qualification but nevertheless is subject to a significant
restriction that the wrong must be sufficiently serious as to constitute
a “fraud on the minority.” Consequently, a minority shareholder
may enforce only particularly egregious breaches of duty—
misappropriation of assets and the like.90 We therefore code this as
0.5 for the entire period.
Eighth, we consider the ability of shareholders to file a personal
action against a resolution of the general meeting—for example, on
the basis that it has not been lawfully constituted. Under UK law,
every shareholder has the power to bring a personal action,91 and so

89. This provision originated in the 1995 version of the Code drawn up by the
Greenbury Committee and became part of the Combined Code drawn up by the Hampel
Committee in 1998. COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: FINAL REPORT, § 4.9
(1998).
90. For an overview of this complex area, see A.J. B OYLE, M INORITY
SHAREHOLDERS ’ R EMEDIES (2002).
91. See, e.g., Edwards v. Halliwell, [1950] 2 All E.R. 1064, 1067.
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a coding of 1 is accorded for the entire period. In other jurisdictions,
codings of less than 1 are given where specific percentage thresholds
are imposed to bring such actions.
The penultimate variable relates to mandatory bid requirements.
These compel the purchaser of more than a stipulated proportion of
the voting rights of a listed company’s share capital to make a tender
offer for the remaining shares at a price no lower than that paid for
the initial acquisitions. Such rules are intended to protect minority
shareholders by providing them with the option to exit the
company—at a price no lower than that which has been paid for the
acquisition of a controlling block—rather than be required to
continue to participate in the firm under the control of the acquirer.
We reason that a lower threshold acquisition level accords greater
protection. In the UK, a mandatory bid requirement was triggered
under the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers for the entire period
following the acquisition of 30% of the voting rights,92 which we
code as 1.
Finally, we consider rules requiring disclosure of share ownership
blocks. These allow investors to know who has amassed significant
stakes in a firm. We reason that greater transparency in this
dimension benefits investors. We give the highest score of 1 for a 3%
threshold, 0.75 for 5%, 0.5 for 10%, 0.25 for 25% and 0 for anything
less. In the UK, disclosure of blocks amounting to 3% or more of the
voting rights has been mandatory since 1989, meaning that we code
this variable as 1 for the entire period.93
2. The twenty-five country creditor protection index
The first variable codifies rules on minimum share capital. These
tend to be regulated by law and fixed at different levels, depending
on the type of the company concerned. In continental European
countries, and civil law systems in general, this instrument has been
widely relied upon for the protection of creditors’ interests. Our
approach to coding concentrates on the minimum capital required
for establishing a private company, interpreted to mean any business
vehicle having separate legal personality and providing all its equity
investors with limited liability. A score of 1 has been assigned to the

92.
93.

City Code on Takeovers and Mergers, rule 9.1.
Companies Act, 1985, § 199(2)(a) (as amended by the Companies Act, 1989).
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law of countries where the minimum capital is fixed at €25,000 or
more, a score of 0 in case of no minimum capital requirements, and a
proportional intermediate score in case of a minimum capital set
between €25,000 and 0. In France, the coding for this variable was
done with regard to the private limited liability corporate form of the
SARL (Société à responsabilité limitée). Up to the end of 2003, the
law94 required a minimum capital of 50,000FF (equivalent to
approximately €7,500) in order to form such company, while from
January 1, 2004 onwards, a SARL could be set up with no minimum
capital whatsoever.95 Therefore, the score for the years 1995 to 2003
is 0.3, while for the remaining period (2004-2005) it decreases to 0.
The second variable, dividend restriction, measures creditor
protection by reference to the degree the company has power to
distribute dividends to shareholders. The variable assigns a score of
0.33 for each of the following provisions: rules on basic dividend
payments with limitations on the maximum amount of accumulated
net profit that can be distributed as dividends and/or mandatory
dividends; restrictions against share repurchase; and rules against
disguised dividend distribution. In France, Article L 225-210 of the
Commercial Code96 deals with basic dividend restrictions, defining
non-distributable reserves and stating that a company must have
reserves, other than the statutory reserve fund, amounting to at least
the value of all its shares. Article L 225-209 of the Commercial
Code97 regulates the acquisition by the company of its own shares,
by providing that the general meeting of a company whose shares are
admitted to trading on a regulated market may authorize the board
of directors or the executive board, as applicable, to purchase a
number of shares representing up to 10% of the company’s capital.
In doing so, the general meeting must define the purposes and terms
of the transaction, as well as its upper limit, and cannot give such
authorization for a period longer than eighteen months. Finally,
Articles L 232-11 and L 232-12 regulate disguised dividend
distributions. Given the presence of these three forms of dividend
restriction, and after assigning a score of 0.33 for Article L 225-210
and Article L 225-209 and a score of 0.17 for Article L 232-11, 12,
the overall coding is 0.83.
94.
95.
96.
97.
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Loi n° 66-537 du 24 juillet 1966 sur les sociétés commerciales, art. 35.
Art. L 223-2, derived from Loi n° 2003-721 du 1 août 2003, art. 1.
Ex art. 217-3, Loi n° 66-537 du 24 juillet 1966.
Loi n° 2003-7 du 3 janvier 2003, art. 50 (II).
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The third variable addresses the issue of directors’ duties towards
creditors. This variable is geared towards the situation of bankruptcy,
and gives a score of 1 when a director has a duty to act in creditors’
interests when the company is balance-sheet insolvent. A score of 0.5
is given where the duty is owed in the case of a commercially
insolvent company, and, finally, a coding of 0 is given where there is
no duty to account for creditors’ interests in these situations. In
France, the Commercial Code at Article L 624-3 rules that, where
managerial negligence contributed to a depletion of corporate assets,
the court may order that all or some of the debts of the company be
borne by its directors. In addition, Article L 624-5 enumerates the
circumstances in which the court may institute an administrative
order or winding-up proceedings against any (paid or unpaid, de jure
or de facto) directors. These situations include those in which the
directors have disposed of the assets of the legal person as their own
property, used the assets or credit of the legal person to the
detriment of its interests either for personal gain or to benefit
another legal person or undertaking in which they had a direct or
indirect interest, abusively pursued a loss-making operation which
was bound to result in the insolvency of the legal person, kept
fictitious accounts or removed accounting documents from the legal
person, or failed to keep accounts required by law. Because of these
stringent laws, the coding is 1 for the entire period.
The fourth variable relates to the possibility offered in various
countries of granting nonpossessory security interests to secure present
and/or future debts, thereby providing a security interest in present
and future, tangible and intangible collateral. It is well established
that most, if not all, jurisdictions allow a nonpossessory security to be
taken over land. Our coding assigns a score of 0.33 in the case where
the law allows the creation of such security interests regarding
personalty (tangible movables), receivables (intangibles), and “all
assets.” In France, with regard to personalty, nonpossessory security
interests are not generally possible over inventory: the most common
form is, instead, the pledge, which requires dispossession of the
debtor. Yet, charges are possible over certain assets, including a
purchase money security interest over material and equipment.98
With regard to receivables, the “Loi Dailly” of 1981 establishes a

98. See Martin Gdanski, Taking Security in France, in C ROSS-B ORDER S ECURITY AND
INSOLVENCY 59, 64–68 (Michael Bridge & Robert Stevens eds., 2001).
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statutory framework specifically for the grant of security over book
debts. With regard to “all assets,” it is believed that the notion of a
“floating charge” is foreign to French law,99 although it is possible to
create a comprehensive pledge, which includes the commercial name,
goodwill, and intellectual property, but excludes real estate, book
debts, inventory, and contractual rights, over the so called “fond de
commerce.”100 For these reasons, the score attributed to this variable
is 0.66.
The fifth variable expands on the fourth and relates to the
registration of the type of nonpossessory security interests just
referenced. In France, registration is required for security over
corporeal moveables,101 but not for incorporeal assets,102 therefore
the coding is 0.33.
The sixth variable is concerned with how far the law allows
creditors to carry out out-of-court enforcement of security interests.
Where they have this power, the score is 1; where they can only act
through a court order, a score of 0 is given. As for most creditors,
out-of-court enforcement or settlement saves time, cost, and human
resources. This possibility is viewed as enhancing creditor protection.
In France, out-of-court enforcement is not possible103 and the
coding is 0.
The seventh variable relates to the degree of power to commence
bankruptcy proceedings. The variable assigns different scores to the
cases of a debtor being able to initiate a bankruptcy proceeding
unilaterally without any insolvency requirement (when the score will
be 0), a debtor being required to initiate bankruptcy proceedings
when the company is balance-sheet insolvent (when the score will be
1), and a bankruptcy proceeding being initiated by any creditor able
to show that the debtor is insolvent by reference to a relevant
criterion (when the score will be 0.5). This variable, therefore,
captures the power of the debtor to use bankruptcy as a threat
against creditors and, conversely, the power of the creditors to use
bankruptcy as a way to compel payment. In France, for the period
considered, the Commercial Code envisages that any single creditor
may commence an insolvency proceeding, while in the case where
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
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Id. at 59.
Id. at 65–66.
Art. 2338 C. CIV.
Art. 2361 C. CIV.
Gdanski, supra note 98, at 79.
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the proceeding is started by the debtor, a cash-flow test is deemed to
be sufficient, with the criterion being whether the debtor is unable
to meet its liabilities out of its disposable assets.104 Hence, the score
is 0.5.
The eighth variable relates to the issue of the stay of secured
creditors in insolvency proceedings. It distinguishes between
situations according to how far there is a compulsory stay where
there is a feasible prospect of a corporate rescue or rehabilitation. In
France, Commercial Code, Article L 621-40 provides for secured
creditors to be stayed: the decision to commence insolvency
proceedings prevents any legal action or any application for
execution against either the real or personal property of the debtor
by any of the creditors whose debts arose before the date of said
decision. This provision must, however, be read together with Article
L 622-23, which rules that secured creditors may nevertheless
exercise individual enforcement in liquidation, if the liquidator has
not sold the assets within three months from the judgment
instituting or ordering a court-ordered winding-up. The coding is
therefore 0.5.
The ninth variable, outcome of bankruptcy proceedings, relates to
how and by whom decisions are made regarding whether a bankrupt
firm continues in operation or has to close down. Where the law
grants that role to the court or to the debtor, the score assigned is 0.
In situations where the power to decide the outcome of the
bankruptcy proceeding is granted primarily to the creditors, the
score will be 1 if the decision rights are allocated to the residual
claimants and 0.5 if the law makes no such specification. In France,
the Commercial Code provides for the court to be the primary
decision maker regarding the outcome of the proceeding,105 and so
the coding is 0.
The final variable is concerned with the rank order of secured
creditors during an insolvency proceeding. The division of security
interests set out here refers back to the fourth variable, and a coding
of 0.25 is assigned for each type of secured creditors who are not

104. Arts. L 620-2, 621-1.
105. Art. L 621-62; see also Arts. L 621-60, 621-61 (explaining that the judicial
administrator, in preparing the report, must consult with creditors and employees; the report is
influential with respect to the court’s decision in the case. This provision was introduced by
Loi n° 94-475 du 10 juin 1994 relative à la prévention et au traitement des difficultés des
entreprises, Official Journal 134 du 11 juin 1994, p. 8440, in force 21 Oct. 1994).
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subordinated by law to preferred claims. In France, the Commercial
Code, at Article L 621-32 II, provides that debts secured by specific
charges over real or personal property are not subordinated in
liquidation.106 The score for this variable is, therefore, 0.75.
D. Issues Arising in the Econometric Analysis of Longitudinal Data
As we shall see in more detail in the next section, the
presentation of longitudinal data collated in the ways just described
can be highly revealing at a purely descriptive level. In addition, once
data exist in this form, it becomes possible to undertake econometric
analysis aimed at identifying the presence of correlations between
legal and economic variables. Time-series and panel-data techniques
can be deployed to identify causal relationships in ways that are not
possible if cross-sectional data (referring to the state of the law only
at a particular point in time) are used. However, these techniques are
not straightforward and their use can give rise to difficult issues of
interpretation.
In cross-sectional analyses, a statistically significant correlation
between an explanatory or “independent” variable, which codes for
legal rules, on the one hand, and an outcome or “dependent”
economic variable, on the other, will not necessarily provide good
evidence of the direction of causal influence. The explanatory
variable may be “endogenous” to the outcome variable in the
technical sense of correlation with the error term in the regression
equation. Where this is the case, a false result may occur; for
example, it could be the case that a given financial indicator is
driving a change in the law rather than the other way round.107
There are a number of techniques available for getting around
this problem of “reverse” or “simultaneous” causation. One is to
identify a so-called “instrumental variable” that is correlated with the
explanatory variable, but is not correlated with the error term. For
example, in the early legal origins literature, scholars used the

106. Introduced by Loi n° 94-475 du 10 juin 1994 relative à la prévention et au
traitement des difficultés des entreprises, Official Journal 134 du 11 juin 1994, p. 8440, in
force 21 Oct. 1994.
107. For a general review of problems of endogeneity in growth regressions of the kind
which are commonly used in the development literature, see Dani Rodrik, Why We Learn
Nothing from Regressing Economic Growth on Policies (Mar. 25, 2005) (Harvard Univ.,
Working Paper), available at http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~drodrik/polocy%20regressions.
pdf.
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common law or civil law origins of different countries’ legal systems
as instruments for the substance of legal rules on shareholder rights.
The assumption was that legal origin likely correlated with the
content of legal rules in these countries; but, conversely, that legal
origin could not plausibly have been influenced by the economic
outcome variables, which were the focus of interest (and so could
not be correlated with the error term). As we have seen,108 this was
because LLSV took the view that most countries’ legal origins were
the result of external events such as colonization or conquest that
had occurred several decades or even centuries before, rather than
being generated by contemporaneous, country-specific economic
forces. By demonstrating a statistical relationship between legal
origin and the different outcome variables, they were able to claim
that the direction of causation ran from law to the economy rather
than vice versa.109
However, there are problems with the instrumental variable
approach. Not only is a degree of subjective judgment involved in
the choice of instrumental variables; a variable will not be a good
instrument if it could have influenced outcomes through channels
other than that of the proposed explanatory variable. As we have
seen, LLSV have more recently come to the view that legal origin
might be influencing the economy through a number of routes,
including interpretive practices and approaches to enforcement, in
addition to that of the content of legal rules. This is the basis on
which they have proposed that legal origin should be seen as a causal
or exogenous variable in its own right, rather than as an instrument
for the content of legal rules.110 As noted above,111 this approach
creates new difficulties since it rests on the questionable assumption
that legal origin, understood as regulatory style, is not susceptible to
feedback effects from the economic environment.
Once longitudinal data become available, a wider range of
econometric techniques can be used to address the issue of causal
inference. Time series datasets may possess a characteristic known as
“nonstationarity.” These are series that do not follow a regular path,
but are prone to irregular deviations, without returning to the
previous trend. Where one or both of two time series is
108.
109.
110.
111.

See id.
La Porta et al., 1998, supra note 5.
La Porta et al., 2008, supra note 2, at 298.
See Rodrik, supra note 107.
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nonstationary in this sense, their error terms are liable to
autocorrelate, again producing spurious regressions. Techniques for
addressing the issue of stationarity through the identification of
“cointegrated” time series—that is to say, times series which are
individually nonstationary, but are linked by a common, stationary
trend—were developed in the 1980s.112 These techniques were later
combined with methods designed to make it possible to draw causal
inferences from correlations in time-series analysis. These mostly
involve variants of so-called “Granger causality” techniques,113
which, in their basic form, involve regressing current values of the
outcome variable against past values of itself and of the explanatory
variable. If the addition of the past values of the explanatory variable
makes a difference to the result, causation is generally assumed,
although it may be more accurate to think of the effect in terms of
precedence. Cointegration-based techniques are thought to be
appropriate where there is a very long time series; conventionally, at
least twenty-five years of annualized data are required. For shorter
time periods, panel-data techniques can be used to identify the
existence of correlations between legal and economic variables in
pooled samples of countries, and Granger causality tests can be
deployed to throw light on the direction of causation.
Our five-country datasets, with their very long time series, are
nonstationary in the sense just described, and cointegration
techniques have been used, as we shall see in more detail below, to
deal with the possibility of autocorrelation and to identify causal
relationships. For the twenty-five-country dataset, with its shorter
time period, we have used panel data techniques in conjunction with
Granger causality tests.114

112. Robert Engle & Clive Granger, Cointegration and Error Correction: Representation,
Estimation, and Testing, 55 E CONOMETRICA 251 (1987).
113. See Clive Granger, Investigating Causal Relations by Econometric Models and CrossSpectral Methods, 37 E CONOMETRICA 424 (1969).
114. For further details of the panel-data techniques used (in this case involving a
random-effects model that is intended to take into account the likelihood that there are
unobserved effects that vary both across countries and across time), see Armour et al., supra
note 75.
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IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
A. Leximetric Analysis

We are now in a position to present our empirical findings. We
begin with a “leximetric” account, which provides a description of
the main trends in legal change that we can identify from our data.
1. Analysis of five countries, 1970-2005
The five-country datasets track the evolution of shareholder and
creditor protection between 1970 and 2005 in the UK, the United
States, France, Germany, and India. Aggregating all the variables
shows how well these legal systems have protected shareholder and
creditor rights over time (see Figures 3 and 4).

Figure 3: Aggregate Shareholder Protection
(60 variables)
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Figure 4: Aggregate Creditor Protection
(44 variables)
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A number of differences between shareholder and creditor
protection can be identified. First, shareholder protection has
increased in all countries, whereas the development of creditor
protection does not show a clear trend. Second, the UK and
Germany have strengthened protection for both shareholders and
creditors over this period, whereas France, India, and the United
States have a lower level of protection for creditors at the end of the
period than at the beginning. Third, shareholder protection has
tended to go up incremental steps, whereas the curves on creditor
protection have clearer “plateaus” and “steps,” indicating that
change is more episodic and, when it occurs, far-reaching.
These observations are not compatible with a legal origin effect,
which is time-invariant and constant across closely related areas of
law. The rank order of the countries changes over time, and there are
very different pictures with respect to shareholder protection and
creditor protection. The substance of our findings also differs from
those of LLSV. We do not find that shareholders and creditors are
1470
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better protected in common law countries than in civil law ones. Nor
does the pace of change seem to differ with regard to these two
broad categories of legal system.
The overall aggregates only provide a highly generalized picture.
It is possible to break our results down by reference to particular
subcategories within each of the main indices. In the case of the
shareholder protection index, we can consider two subcategories,
concerning protection of shareholders against boards and
management
and protection against other shareholders
respectively.115 Table 1 presents summary data for these two subcategories on a country-by-country basis (the deeper shading
indicates higher scores). For creditor protection we can distinguish
between rules that take effect by limiting the freedom of the debtor
firm to engage in activities that may harm creditors, rules that take
effect by facilitating creditor contracting for greater protection, and
rules that take effect by facilitating creditor power in bankruptcy
proceedings.116 The results of the scores for these subcategories are
summarized in Table 2 on a country-by-country basis.

115. Lele & Siems, supra note 75.
116. Armour et al., supra note 77.
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Table 1: Shareholder Protection in Five Countries 1970-2005:
Mean (and Standard Deviation)

France
Germany
India
UK
U.S.

Protection against
boards and
management
(42 variables)
22.55 (3.12)
21.56 (2.03)
23.06 (2.18)
23.27 (3.44)
21.24 (1.90)

Protection against
other shareholders
(18 variables)
9.63 (0.71)
10.26 (0.65)
8.27 (0.70)
8.20 (0.38)
8.69 (0.86)

Table 2: Creditor Protection in Five Countries 1970-2005:
Mean (and Standard Deviation)

France
Germany
India
UK
U.S.

Debtor control
(15 variables)
7.03 (0.17)
11.61 (0.71)
4.02 (0.14)
7.33 (1.90)
6.06 (1.22)

Credit contracts
(10 variables)
4.08 (0.64)
7.06 (0.11)
7.41 (0.57)
7.97 (0.71)
7.88 (0.65)

Insolvency
(19 variables)
9.26 (1.51)
12.82 (0.66)
10.33 (1.95)
12.78 (0.71)
8.56 (0.97)

—————————————————————————————
Related papers have discussed the trends in the subindices in
some detail,117 so we will only summarize the main findings here.
Once the main indices are broken down into their component parts,
we can see that countries can arrive at similar levels of protection
overall, through different methods. For example, in the United
States and the UK, creditors have a comparative advantage in
mechanisms that facilitate contracting for greater protection, whereas
in Germany creditors are better protected than in other countries
mainly through controls over debtor activities (see Table 2).
In shareholder protection, we would expect to find that rules
protecting minority shareholders against expropriation by majorities
would be stronger in jurisdictions in which share ownership was
concentrated in the hands of blockholders (Germany, France, and
117. See Armour et al., supra note 77; Lele & Siems, supra note 75.
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India), and that rules protecting shareholders against boards would
receive more emphasis in jurisdictions in which dispersed ownership
is the norm (the UK and the United States). Table 1 suggests that
France and Germany provide higher than average “minoritymajority” protection, but that India does not. This suggests that
legal origin may be a force for inertia; India’s common law heritage
may not have been equipped as well to adopt laws that tend to be
found in civilian regimes for governing minority-majority conflicts.
On the other hand, we find that the average level of protection for
external shareholders against boards and management is strongest in
the UK but weakest in the United States. A supposedly core feature
of “Anglo-Saxon” corporate law seems to be only weakly present in
the American case, by comparison with the practice in civilian
countries. Another way of interpreting this result is that two of the
parent civil law regimes, France and Germany, were strengthening
the position of minority shareholders with regard to boards and
managers over the period of the study, as was the UK, while this
aspect of U.S. law changed hardly at all prior to the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002.
2. Analysis of twenty-five countries, 1995–2005
In Figures 5 through 12 we present our twenty-five-country data
by reference to the principal legal origin “families” of English,
French, and German law, and a fourth category consisting of
transition systems, all of which, in this sample, are of German
origin.118 For this purpose, we mostly adopt the classifications of
systems used by LLSV. Some of these classifications are problematic,
for reasons explored earlier,119 but this mode of presentation may be
useful for comparing our results with LLSV’s.

118. While most transition systems (and all of those in the current sample) can be
categorized as having a German-law origin, there is a case for treating them separately from the
other categories since their recent evolution has been considerably influenced by American,
English, and French law, as well as German law. There is also some residual “socialist law”
influence. On the category of “socialist law,” see La Porta et al., 2008, supra note 2, at 288.
119. ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 39, at 279, 281. Zweigert and Kötz treat the
Scandinavian systems as a separate category because they are not based on a single civil code
model as can be said of the French and German systems. In practice, the Scandinavian systems
have been heavily influenced by German law. In fact, we categorize them as German-origin
systems for present purposes, while recognizing that this classification (like all those involving
legal “families”) is open to question. See discussion supra Part II.
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The results for shareholder protection indicate a generally rising
trend over the period covered. All systems have improved their
general level of shareholder protection, with certain variables,
particularly those relating to independent board membership and the
mandatory bid rule in hostile takeover bids, showing rapid increases.
In that sense there has been convergence around standards which
originated in the common law systems, particularly the UK, and
which in the course of the 1990s and 2000s have come to be
associated with global “best practice.”120 There are, however, some
divergences by reference to legal origin and to the state of transition
and development of the different countries.

Figure 5: Shareholder protection in
English legal origin countries (10 variables)
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120. While the notion of global “best practice” in corporate governance is necessarily a
rather vague one, it may be relevant to note that the OECD’s P RINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
G OVERNANCE, supra note 78, gives prominence to standards on independent boards and the
role of the mandatory bid rule in takeover bids (which, by requiring the bidder to make an
offer for the entire share capital of the company once his holding reaches a certain level, is
intended to protect minority shareholders against expropriation). For further discussion, see
Armour et al., supra note 77.
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Figure 6: Shareholder protection in
French legal origin countries (10 variables)
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Figure 7: Shareholder protection in
German legal origin countries (10 variables)
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Figure 8: Shareholder protection in
transition countries (10 variables)
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The general rise in protection suggests that legal origin has not
been a barrier to convergence and, indeed, it is the case that, on
average, both developed and developing civil law countries had a
faster rate of increase than common law ones. When we break down
the sample into individual legal “families,” however, certain
differences emerge. The English-origin systems have above average
scores for variables 1, 3, 5, and 7, which refer respectively to the
powers of the general meeting to control transactions entered into
by the board, the power of shareholders to take part in decision
making without being physically present at meetings, requirements
for independent directors on the board, and the availability of
derivative suits to enforce directors’ duties. These are all indicators of
corporate law regimes in which the main problem is the possibility of
expropriation of shareholder interests by powerful boards or
managers.
In French legal-origin systems, the pattern just indicated is
reversed: variables 1, 3, 5, and 7 have relatively low scores.
Strikingly, France itself is an outlier in this group, indicating that the
high level of shareholder protection rights in the parent system has
not so far transmitted itself to other members of the group. One
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possible interpretation of this result is that legal origin is not a strong
force here, and that the very concept of a French-origin “family”
makes little sense in this context. An alternative view is that the civil
law tradition is proving to be a greater obstacle to convergence
outside France than in the system of origin. This seems paradoxical—
why should the parent system have been quicker to converge on
global corporate governance standards than the rest? One possibility
is that a certain regulatory style may be better suited to local
conditions in the parent system, alongside which it will have
coevolved,121 than in systems into which it has been transplanted.122
German legal-origin systems score strongly on variable 8, which
is concerned with the power of minority shareholders to block a
resolution of the general meeting. This is not surprising, since such a
power would provide an important mechanism for shareholder
protection in systems with blockholder forms of ownership. Germanorigin scores are nevertheless up across the board. In 1995, the
scores for German legal-origin systems were below the average for
the whole sample; by the end of the period, they were above it.
Scores for developing countries are, on average, below those for
developed ones in both the common law and civil law countries,
while transition systems also have below average scores in relation to
the sample as a whole. However, some transition systems are among
those undergoing the most rapid movement towards a more
shareholder-protective regime, under the influence of external
pressures. The jump in the Russian score indicates the influence of
Western (and, specifically, Anglo-American) models for the Joint
Stock Company Law of 1995, while the more incremental rises in
the Czech Republic, Latvia, and Slovenia are driven in part by the
adoption of European Community law standards.123

121. For a discussion on coevolution, see Part II above.
122. There is substantial literature on the difficulties involved in the transplantation of
legal institutions. See Dan Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor & Jean-Francois Richard, The
Transplant Effect, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 163 (2003); Katharina Pistor, Yoram Keinan, Jan
Kleinheisterkamp & Mark D. West, The Evolution of Corporate Law: A Cross-Country
Comparison, 23 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 791 (2003). According to Botero et al., supra note
23, at 1346, “path dependence in the legal and regulatory styles emerges as an efficient
adaptation to the previously transplanted legal infrastructure.”
123. For further analysis of the differences in shareholder protection across countries in
this dataset, see Armour et al., supra note 77; Siems, supra note 46; Michael Schouten &
Mathias Siems, The Evolution of Ownership Disclosure Rules across Countries (SSRN Working
Paper Series, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1434144.
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The results for the twenty-five-country creditor protection index
are different from those obtained from the five-country study. With
this larger sample, certain trends by reference to legal origin become
clear. There is no overall common law-civil law divide, but there is
evidence of divergence of experience by reference to the legal
“families.” French-origin systems have a significantly lower level of
overall creditor protection than either the English-origin or Germanorigin countries. The French-origin countries are strong on dividend
restrictions (variable 2), but relatively weak on minimum capital
requirements (variable 1), creditor contract rights (variables 4-6),
and creditor protection in insolvency (variables 8-10). The Englishorigin systems tend to stress creditors’ contract rights and are weak
on minimum capital requirements and rules governing entry into
bankruptcy proceedings. German legal-origin countries have high
scores on minimum capital requirements, rules on entry into
insolvency, and the priority of secured creditors, and tend not to
have low scores on any of the variables.

Figure 9: Creditor protection in
English legal origin countries (10 variables)
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Figure 10: Creditor protection in
French legal origin countries (10 variables)
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Figure 11: Creditor protection in
German legal origin countries (10 variables)
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Figure 12: Creditor protection in
transition countries (10 variables)
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Although the common upwards trend, which is found with
respect to shareholder protection, is absent in the case of creditor
rights, most of the countries in the sample have undergone
bankruptcy law reforms of some kind over the past ten years, with
several of them initiating attempts to speed up or better regulate
corporate reorganization procedures. There is a mixed picture on
minimum capital requirements; France abolished these, effective in
2004, but most other civil law systems have maintained or
strengthened this form of protection in the period under review.
This kind of protection for creditors is generally absent in the
common law systems.
Across the sample as a whole, developing and transition systems
have lower scores than developed ones, but the gap between
developed and developing/transition systems is less marked than the
difference between the three legal origin “families.” French legalorigin developing systems have experienced a greater increase in their
scores than any group, in both absolute and relative terms. Germanorigin developing and transition systems have also increased their
scores over this period, whereas those for English-origin developing
systems have changed the least.
Why do we find evidence of a strong legal origin effect, at least
by reference to the three main legal “families,” in the case of creditor
rights when it is missing in the case of shareholder rights?
1480

DO NOT DELETE

1435

2/26/2010 1:14 PM

Law and Financial Development

Historically, civil law systems had less extensive systems of security
interests than common law ones. In the French civil code, only two
types of security interests were recognized, namely mortgage (for
nonpossessory interests) and pledge (for possessory ones); these were
imported directly from Roman law. In French-origin systems, types
of nonpossessory security interests over property other than land had
to be introduced through ad hoc statutes aimed at facilitating access
to credit. While some of these laws included specific provisions for
registration, others simply relied upon the registration rules already
provided by the various civil codes. The recognition of security
interests in the French civil law “family” has tended to remain
limited and unsystematic. In the German-origin countries, by
comparison, the courts developed the notion of the “quasi-floating
charge” by way of transfer of title, and the countries generally took a
more flexible approach with respect to the protection of secured
creditors’ rights.124 This is an instance where the division of labor
between case law and legislation mattered, but interestingly within
the wider civil law category.
B. Econometric Analysis
With time-series data available, it becomes possible to estimate
the economic impact of legal change and, conversely, to study the
possible impact of economic conditions on the law. A number of
econometric studies using the datasets described above have been
carried out. This is a work in progress, and it is not possible to report
a complete set of results here. Nevertheless, some trends are
beginning to emerge from the literature.
The most striking result is the absence of the expected
relationship between shareholder protection and stock market
development. La Porta et al.’s original “law and finance” study
found that a high score on the antidirector rights index correlated
with a number of measures of financial development including stock
market capitalization as a proportion of GDP.125 Fagernäs et al.126
124. See generally Hugh S. Pigott, The Need for Harmonisation of Collateral Law in
Europe, 15 E UR . B US. L. REV . 871 (2004).
125. La Porta et al., 1998, supra note 5.
126. Sonja Fagernäs, Prabirjit Sarkar & Ajit Singh, Legal Origin, Shareholder Protection
and the Stock Market: New Challenges from Time Series Analysis, in T HE E CONOMICS OF
CORPORATE G OVERNANCE AND M ERGERS 20 (Klaus Gugler & B. Burcin Yurtoglu eds.,
2008).
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carried out an analysis of the relationship between the five-country
shareholder protection index for the period 1970-2005 and changes
in the stock-market turnover ratio for France, Germany, the UK, and
the U.S. stock market turnover ratios measure the relationship
between the value of shares traded and stock market capitalization.
They have risen in each of the four countries in this study since the
1970s, particularly in France and the United States. In Germany
there has been a more oscillating pattern with no clear increase in the
turnover ratio since the mid-1980s.
Fägernas et al. used the autoregressive distributive lag (ARDL)
approach to cointegration to ascertain the existence of a long run
relationship between the stock market turnover ratio and the
shareholder protection index, together with its different
components. In order to account for the possibility that the overall
level of the national economy was affecting the stock market
behavior, they included the log-value of GDP in their model. They
found that increases in shareholder protection did not appear to have
had a positive link with stock market development as reflected in the
stock market turnover ratio, irrespective of legal origin. They found a
negative relationship between both the index as a whole and its two
component elements (protection against boards and protection
against majority shareholders) for France and the UK For Germany
and the United States, no relationship either way could be identified.
In a related paper, Sarkar127 carried out similar tests to see if there
was a relationship between shareholder protection and stock market
development in India over the same period. No relationship was
found.
Armour et al. carried out a panel data analysis to determine
whether higher scores in the extended-sample shareholder protection
index are correlated with an increased level of stock market
development, taking into account a number of other potentially
relevant factors including the effectiveness of legal enforcement in
the countries concerned (as measured by the World Bank’s “rule of
law index”).128 The four measures of stock market development

127. Prabirjit Sarkar, Corporate Governance, Stock Market Development and Private
Capital Accumulation: A Case Study of India, in INDIA M ACROECONOMICS ANNUAL (S.
Marjit ed., 2008).
128. Armour et al., supra note 83. This study covers only twenty of the twenty-five
countries now contained in the dataset (as only twenty had been coded at that point). The
sample of countries analyzed by Armour et al. is similar, in terms of its composition, to that
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which are available on a longitudinal basis were used: stock market
capitalization as a percentage of GDP; shares traded as a percentage
of GDP; the ratio of shares traded to real stock market capitalization;
and the number of listed companies per million of the population.
Contrary again to the results from LLSV’s cross-sectional study, their
analysis finds no statistically significant positive correlation between
shareholder protection and the level of stock market development,
and a negative correlation in relation to the number of listed
companies. Granger causality tests showed that the direction of
causation ran from the increase in shareholder protection to the
decline in the number of listed companies, not the other way round.
These are broadly similar results, in terms of their implications for
the relationship between shareholder protection and stock market
development, to those obtained by Fagernäs et al.129 and Sarkar130 in
their analyses of the five-country dataset.
These findings are open to a number of interpretations. One is
that they may reflect difficulty in getting clear-cut results from timeseries data, by comparison to cross-sectional analyses. This is refuted
by the existence of results from other studies using the five-country
datasets. Analyzing the five-country labor regulation dataset using
the ARDL approach, Deakin and Sarkar131 found evidence that
productivity and employment growth are positively correlated with
the strengthening of certain labor standards (mostly those relating to
working time and dismissal law) in civil law systems. Similarly,
Deakin, Demetriades, and James132 report the findings of a
cointegration analysis of creditor protection datasets for India and
find evidence that the strengthening of secured creditors’ rights was
causally related to an increase in banking sector development.
A second possibility is that our longitudinal datasets are in some
way defective as an account of legal change. However, by
comparison to their only significant rivals, the datasets created by
analyzed by La Porta et al. in their first “law and finance” study. La Porta et al., 1998, supra
note 5; see Armour et al., supra note 83, at 360.
129. Fagernäs et al., supra, note 126.
130. Sarkar, supra, note 127.
131. Simon Deakin & Prabirjit Sarkar, Assessing the Long-Run Economic Impact of Labour
Law Systems: A Theoretical Reappraisal and Analysis of New Time Series Data, 39 INDUS. REL.
J. 453 (2008).
132. Simon Deakin, Panicos Demetriades & Gregory James, Creditor Rights and
Banking System Development in India (SSRN Working Paper Series, 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1208866.
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LLSV, they have the advantage of incorporating a wider range of
legal information and adopting a more flexible approach to coding.
The codings of civil law countries in our twenty-five-country
shareholder protection index are significantly higher than those
provided by LLSV in their “law and finance” paper, and the codings
of common law systems are, on average, correspondingly lower.133
We interpret this as evidence for the value of a “functional” approach
to coding, which seeks to use indicators of potential relevance to a
range of different country contexts. Put slightly differently, the
approach avoids “home-country bias.”
Methodological criticisms aside, it is plausible that our results are
pointing to findings with real economic significance. The absence of
a correlation between corporate law reform and stock market
development suggests that the strengthening of shareholder rights,
which took place in the 1990s and 2000s, has not been having its
principal intended effect. This could be because national conditions
may be setting limits to the effectiveness of legal transplants. Hence,
while we report substantial formal convergence of laws, our
econometric results suggest that functional discontinuities persist.
This result is not incompatible with the legal origins hypothesis,
particularly in the modified form presented most recently by La
Porta et al.134 It could be that changes in the substantive content of
laws, in the form of convergence along the lines of a common law or
Anglo-American model, have had little impact in the face of a
relatively unchanging “legal infrastructure” in civil law, developing,
and transition systems. Legal origin may be working, through
channels other than those of the formal content of the law, to
frustrate the intentions of law reformers.
However, we also need to take into account evidence that is
weak (at best) for a positive relationship between stock market
development and the strengthening of shareholder rights in common
law countries, and not just in civil law and transition ones. In our
panel data analysis we found that English legal origin was positively
and significantly associated with one of the four measures of stock
market development that we were concerned with, namely the
number of listed companies.135 In the case of the other three

133. Armour et al., supra note 83, at 356–57.
134. La Porta et al., 2008, supra note 2.
135. Armour et al., supra note 83, at 366–68.
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variables, there was no significant relationship. In the case of the
time-series analysis, we found no statistically significant relationship
in either direction between changes in shareholder rights and the
stock market turnover ratio for the United States; in the case of
Britain, we found a statistically significant relationship, but the sign
was negative. Thus, it would seem that greater shareholder
protection has not enhanced financial development even in the
common law systems. It could be that increases in shareholder
protection on the scale witnessed since the mid-1990s have been
“too much of a good thing,”136 imposing undue costs and limiting
the attractiveness of the listed company option.
With these possible explanations in mind, we are now in a
position to reassess legal origins theory in the light of our empirical
results.
V. THEORETICAL REEVALUATION
As we have seen, the relationship between investor protection
rules and the economy has been theorized in a number of ways. The
legal origins hypothesis posits a causal role for legal institutions in the
creation of legal rules. Early versions of the theory suggested a
unidirectional relationship: legal origins, established (in some cases,
centuries ago) and transplanted through conquest and colonization,
affected the ways in which countries developed their investor
protection rules in the course of the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries. In this view, legal origins were seen as an exogenous
constraint on the extent to which economic forces and interest group
politics could shape outcomes.137 This constraint, it was argued,
could lead to differences in investor protection, which, in turn,
would lead to differential financial market development.
By contrast, political economy theories view the content of legal
rules primarily as a phenomenon engendered by the alignment of
interest groups.138 In this view, the state of the economy is the

136. Valentina Bruno & Stijn Claessens, Corporate Governance and Regulation: Can
There Be Too Much of a Good Thing?, (ECGI-Finance, Working Paper No. 142, 2007)
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=956329.
137. La Porta et al., 1998, supra note 5.
138. See, e.g., PETER ALEXIS GOUREVTICH & JAMES J. SHINN, POLITICAL POWER AND
CORPORATE CONTROL: THE NEW GLOBAL POLITICS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2005);
Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, The Great Reversals: The Politics of Financial
Development in the Twentieth Century, 69 J. FIN. ECON. 5 (2003).
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ultimate cause of legal change, with economic forces operating
through the channel of the political system. Thus, financial market
development stimulates demand for legal protection of investors, not
the other way around.139
The existence of a link between particular legal institutions and
the content or style of legal rules does not, of course, rule out a role
for political economy. Rather, legal institutions can be understood as
interacting with interest group politics in the production of legal
rules.140 The outcome of previous rounds of political settlements will
affect the current allocation of resources, and consequently the
relationship between legal rules and the economy can be thought of
as bi- rather than unidirectional—that is, a “rolling relation.”141
Legal origins theorists argue that the nature of a country’s legal
institutions is nevertheless a more significant determinant of investor
protection (and thence financial market) outcomes than its political
makeup. The link between origins and rules is thereby viewed as
being one about the style of regulation142—that is, the processes
employed to execute outputs from a policy process.
For economists and development agencies, the most important
question concerns the extent to which legal institutions affect
financial market development, whether directly or indirectly. In
other words, the question is whether differences in regulatory styles
are associated with differences in the function of resulting legal
rules—that is, differences in the way in which they actually perform
in, say, protecting investors and stimulating investment. For
comparative lawyers, by contrast, understanding simply the existence
and determinants of differences in the form of legal rules may be of
interest, even if they are inconsequential for the real economy.143
Both groups, however, have an interest in clarifying the nature of the

139. Cheffins, supra note 35; Coffee, supra note 35.
140. La Porta et al., 2008, supra note 2.
141. See CURTIS J. M ILHAUPT & KATHARINA P ISTOR , LAW AND C APITALISM : W HAT
CORPORATE CRISES R EVEAL ABOUT L EGAL SYSTEMS AND E CONOMIC D EVELOPMENT
AROUND THE W ORLD (2008). The notion that channels of causation run in both directions
between legal institutions and the economy may be traced back to Weber. See MAX WEBER,
ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1978) (1922).
142. Botero, supra note 23.
143. On the significance of the difference between the form and the function of legal
rules, see, for example, Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of
Form or Function, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 329 (2001).
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law-economy relationship at a conceptual level. Does the empirical
evidence emerging from time-series datasets assist this process?
A. The Extent of Path Dependencies by Legal Origin
1. Legal origins
Our indexing efforts reveal a number of stylized facts about the
evolution of investor protection rules. First, within our time period
there are differences between the content of investor protection rules
by legal origin. However, the scope of these differences varies
considerably depending on the type of rule in question. Differences
in shareholder protection by reference to legal origin are relatively
modest; moreover, the cross-country differences are much smaller
than the intertemporal changes in shareholder protection that have
occurred universally in our sample countries during the study period.
In creditor protection, however, there are cross-country differences,
which are persistent over time.144 Moreover, these differences appear
to be related to legal origins, a result emerging from our more
extensive twenty-five country sample. German legal origin countries
persistently have the strongest overall protection of creditor rights,
closely followed by English legal origin countries; French legal origin
countries persistently have the weakest.
Moreover, there is evidence of particular emphases in legal
protection styles. Thus within creditor rights, English legal origins
have generally stronger protection of creditor contract rights, and
generally weaker minimum capital restrictions; German legal origins
have generally stronger minimum capital requirements and duties on
directors to file for insolvency when companies are financially
distressed; and French legal origin countries have generally weaker
insolvency (or bankruptcy) law protection for creditors.145
2. State of development
In both our twenty-five country shareholder and creditor rights
indices, developing and transition economies have lower average
scores throughout the study period than do developed countries.
This is consistent with the claim that greater investor protection is
144. We observed similar patterns in the evolution of shareholder and creditor protection
in our five-country, thirty-six-year dataset. See Armour et al., supra note 77, at 609–15.
145. See id. at 613–14.
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associated with greater financial sector development. However, our
econometric tests fail to reject the null hypothesis of no link between
these variables.146 Moreover, variable-by-variable analyses of creditor
rights reveal that there is less variance in average scores by variable
for developing, as opposed to developed countries, than there is
when the analysis is conducted by reference to the legal origin of
countries. The fact that differences between the formal structure of
legal rules is greater by legal origin than by state of development,
and that we find no statistically significant link between development
and rule content, is consistent with the ideas that regulatory style
(a) exhibits path dependencies (the association with legal origin) but
(b) is largely a formal, rather than a functional, matter. In other
words, different rule-types (to which we may add, different types of
private contracts made in the shadow of the legal rules) are capable
of achieving similar outcomes in the real economy, with no
corresponding differences in financial development.
3. Rule types
A novel finding from our data is the way in which indices for
different types of rules exhibit different properties both in relation to
legal origins and to changes over time. For example, in our twentyfive country datasets, shareholder rights show relatively little variance
by legal origin, and exhibit a relatively high degree of convergence
over time. In contrast, creditor rights display a more significant
degree of variation by legal origin, and do not converge in any
obvious way—differences by origin remain persistent over time.
Corresponding differences are also present in our five-country
dataset: here, shareholder rights again show more convergence than
do creditor rights.147 No strong relationships with legal origins
emerge in either of the two five-country datasets, although this may
well simply be an artifact of the small sample size.
Why should different rule-types change at different paces? If legal
origins exert a form of path dependency on the content of legal
rules, why is this greater in relation to creditor rights than for
shareholder rights? Three plausible, and complementary,
explanations present themselves. The first relates to switching costs.

146. Fagernäs et al., supra note 126; Sarkar, supra note 127; Armour et al., supra note
83.
147. Armour et al., supra note 77, at 620–25.
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Creditor rights are, in a sense, more fundamental (in the sense of
being less susceptible to alteration) than shareholder rights.148 The
latter affect only parties who choose to become shareholders: the
relation is essentially voluntary. Thus, the role of law in relation to
shareholder rights is essentially one of providing standard terms that
reduce parties’ contracting costs. Parties who do not like these terms
may usually contract around them.149 This means that it is quite
straightforward to enhance shareholder rights on a prospective basis.
A new form of business organization, a new stock exchange, or a
new body of listing rules, may be introduced only for those firms
that choose to utilize the new framework—for example, the creation
of the Stock Exchange Board of India (SEBI),150 or the Novo
Mercado in Brazil.151 This involves far lower switching costs.
Secondly, and because of this difference, an improvement in
shareholder rights for publicly-traded companies does not entail
significant distributional effects for any parties enjoying privileged
positions under the existing framework.152 In contrast, changes to
creditor rights affect not only the parties to particular (credit)
contracts, but also affect all other actual or potential creditors either
by altering their potential payoffs in insolvency if the debtor defaults,
or the probability that the debtor will in fact default at all.153 This
change in creditor rights implies more extensive distributional effects
and consequently greater resistance.154 For example, foreign banks,
lacking local knowledge, benefit disproportionately from
148. See, e.g., John Armour & Michael J. Whincop, The Proprietary Foundations of
Corporate Law, 27 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 429 (2007); Kenneth Ayotte & Patrick Bolton,
Optimal Property Rights in Financial Contracting (American Law and Economics Association,
Working
Paper
No.
4,
2007),
available
at
http://repositories.cdlib.org/
berkeley_law_econ/Spring2007a/4/; Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential
Role of Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387 (2000).
149. See Armour & Whincop, supra note 148.
150. See generally John Armour & Priya Lele, Law, Finance, and Politics: The Case of
India, 43 L. & SOC’Y REV. 491 (2009); see also Afra Afsharipour, Corporate Governance
Convergence: Lessons from the Indian Experiment, 29 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 335, 355–56
(2009).
151. Ronald J. Gilson, Henry Hansmann & Mariana Pargendler, Dual Capital Markets as
a Financial Development Strategy: Brazil, the U.S., and the EU (Yale Law School, Working
Paper, 2009); see also Erica Gorga, Changing the Paradigm of Stock Ownership from
Concentrated Towards Dispersed Ownership? Evidence from Brazil and Consequences for
Emerging Countries, 29 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 439 (2009).
152. Id.
153. See sources cited supra note 148.
154. Armour & Lele, supra note 150, at 504, 520.
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enhancements of creditor rights in transition economies.155 Domestic
banks may therefore have incentives to oppose improvements in
creditor rights for competitive reasons. In contrast, improvements to
the rights of shareholders in public firms affect only those firms that
choose to go public; in most countries only a minority of large firms
are publicly-traded.156 Hence, blockholders who wish to avoid losing
out from the new rules need not oppose the rules; they need only
avoid an IPO.157
B. The Mechanisms of Path Dependencies by Legal Origin
A recurring weakness in the legal origins literature has been the
limitation of the theoretical mechanisms responsible for the path
dependencies associated with legal origins. One way forward, we
suggest, is through a more detailed account of the institutional
mechanisms by which path dependencies may persist. It may be
more helpful to proceed by developing categorizations based around
measurable indicia of the relevant mechanisms, rather than using the
often problematic “legal families” classification, particularly when the
latter lacks a firm theoretical base. Here we sketch the contours of
such an account, based on the quantitative and qualitative evidence
we have gathered on the processes of legal change. We organize the
discussion around three key ideas: mode of lawmaking, mechanisms
of enforcement, and sharing of property rights.
1. Mode of lawmaking
A leading early account articulates two channels by which legal
origin may affect the real economy: the “adaptability” channel,
whereby common law (judicial) lawmaking is associated with greater
responsiveness to economic change, and the “political” or “judicial
independence” channel, whereby common law judges are associated
with greater freedom from executive influence and consequently
lower propensity to engage in rent-seeking.158 Both channels focus
155. Rainer Haselmann, Katharina Pistor & Vikrant Vig, How Law Affects Lending, 25–
26, 35 (Munich Personal RePEc Archive, Working Paper No. 157, 2006), available at
http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/157/.
156. See, e.g., Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W.
Vishny, Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131, 1137 (1997).
157. Gilson et al., supra note 151.
158. Thorsten Beck, Asli Demirgüc-Kunt & Ross Levine, Law and Finance: Why Does
Legal Origin Matter?, 31 J. COMP. ECON. 653 (2003).
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on the role of judicial, as opposed to statutory, lawmaking. The
judicial mode of lawmaking is said to be more responsive to
efficiency-enhancing changes (adaptability channel) and less
susceptible to capture by interest group politics than statutory law
making (judicial independence channel). What matters from a
comparative, systemic perspective, then, is the extent of judicial,
versus statutory, lawmaking.
A basic problem with this characterization is that, in relation to
investor protection law at least, most—if not all—countries have
codified the relevant rules. In other words, the simple extent of
judicial, as opposed to statutory, law making varies little across
systems. This variation reveals itself in the lack of obvious differences
in the nature of legal change in our study countries. If there were
important differences in the extent of judicial lawmaking, we would
expect to see a pattern of change that differed depending on a
country’s legal origin. Common law countries would be expected to
have more rapid accretions of changes in response to development,
whereas civilian countries would be expected to have less frequent
but more emphatic changes, corresponding to systemic updates of
their codes. The results from our five-country and twenty-fivecountry datasets show, however, no discernible difference in the
nature of change by legal origin. Shareholder rights have advanced
across the board, in a manner that looks roughly similar in all our
studied jurisdictions, and to the extent that there is change in
creditor rights, its nature and extent does not vary by legal origin.
Acknowledging the near-universal codification of investor
protection laws requires a refinement of the function courts perform
in relation to these channels. A revised version of the “adaptability”
channel, for example, would view courts not as providing the bulk of
precedents, but rather as providing interstitial decisions on the
interpretation or operation of the law.159 On this view, we should not
expect to see differences in the pattern of law production over time,
as measured in our indices. This is not, therefore, a mechanism for
legal path dependence, but rather an alternate channel (other than
via legal rules) through which the structure of legal institutions may
affect the real economy. Thus, we might expect differences in the
functionality of systems of investor protection depending on the
degree of efficacy of their courts. To some degree, measures of the

159. See La Porta et al., 2008, supra note 2.

1491

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2/26/2010 1:14 PM

2009

“formalism” of court procedure may capture these differences.160
However, it seems plausible that there may be other factors at work,
which make a difference to the operation of courts.
In particular, we consider that there may be important functional
consequences flowing from differences in the structure of the courts
or tribunals. Variables that may have an impact on court performance
include (a) judicial human capital (selection, training, and
professional background),161 which will affect the quality of decisions
produced; (b) court procedural rules, including standing, costs,
litigation funding, and the availability of class actions, each of which
will affect the likelihood that an action will in fact be brought;162 and
(c) the function performed—whether solely for ex post challenge
through litigation, or whether the court or tribunal performs an ex
ante gatekeeper function.163
It is less than clear that these factors match up with the allocation
of “legal origin.” In fact, our case studies cast some doubt on the
idea. For example, India, a common law country, suffers from
problematic rules of civil procedure that engender delays of ten years
or more in a typical civil trial.164 Nevertheless, successful
development of its stock markets may be explicable in part through
the establishment of a dedicated tribunal (the Securities Appellate
Tribunal, or SAT, associated with SEBI) with sector-specific
expertise and streamlined procedural rules.165 There is no reason to
suppose that such specialist securities tribunals could only be
established in common law countries; nor should we rely, in relation
to investor protection, on any measure of the quality of courts that
does not code specifically for tribunals that make decisions in
relation to this area of law.166 This may help to explain why, if this is a
160. See Djankov et al., supra note 24.
161. Gillian K. Hadfield, The Levers of Legal Design: Institutional Determinants of the
Quality of Law, 36 J. COMP. ECON. 43 (2008).
162. Id.; see also John Armour, Bernard S. Black, Brian R. Cheffins & Richard Nolan,
Private Enforcement of Corporate Law: An Empirical Comparison of the UK and US, 7 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 2010).
163. John Armour & David A. Skeel, Jr., Who Makes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and
Why? The Peculiar Divergence of U.S. and U.K. Takeover Regulation, 95 GEO. L.J. 1727,
1767–84 (2007).
164. Armour & Lele, supra note 150.
165. Id.
166. For example, in relation to the United Kingdom, failure to take into account the
Takeover Code, promulgated by the Takeover Panel, which for most of its history has been
entirely self-regulatory, would result in a wholly misleading picture of takeover regulation. See
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channel through which legal institutions affect the real economy, we
find no empirical association between legal origin and stock market
development.167 A more focused empirical test would code the
foregoing differences in the structure of courts directly.168
For a more nuanced version of the “judicial independence”
channel, an additional set of factors is likely to be significant: namely
(d) the status of courts in the constitutional hierarchy. That is, courts
with extensive powers of judicial review of primary legislation are
able to act as a restraint on the operation of interest group politics,
even if the formal (observed) extent of judicial law making is quite
small. This review may have an effect both on the real economy and
on the formal content of legal rules. Again, however, this pattern
need not vary along the lines of legal origin. For example, in
England, despite its status as “mother country” of the common law
legal origin, courts have no constitutional power to strike down
primary legislation.169
2. Enforcement
Theory suggests that the efficacy of legal rules at imparting
incentives to actors in the corporate sector will be a function not
only of their substantive content, but also of their enforcement.170 In
the literature on legal origins, contributions to date have sought to
bifurcate enforcement mechanisms into “public” (initiated by state
agencies) and “private” (initiated by citizens or corporations). Public
enforcement agencies typically do not keep the rewards of their
efforts, and so have lower incentives to engage in enforcement—and
hence a lower deterrent effect—than do private actors.171

Armour & Skeel, supra note 163, at 1735–38, 1782–84.
167. See generally Fagernäs et al., supra note 126; Sarkar, supra note 127; Armour et al.,
supra note 75.
168. See Mathias M. Siems, Legal Adaptability in Elbonia, 2 INT’ L . J.L. C ONTEXT 393,
393–408 (2006).
169. See Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 4(6) (U.K.).
170. See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12
(1910); Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON.
169 (1968).
171. La Porta et al., 2006, supra note 13; see also Jonathan R. Hay & Andrei Shleifer,
Private Enforcement of Public Laws: A Theory of Legal Reform, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 398 (1998)
(discussing the emergence of private enforcement to address gaps in the system of public
enforcement in Russia in the 1990s).
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The measurement of the efficacy of enforcement mechanisms has
proved just as difficult as of the quality of law. Early indices based on
the extent of enforcement powers172 asserted the superiority of
private enforcement, a preference that also appeared to correlate with
English legal origin. However, other studies using data based on
resources directed toward enforcement173 or penalties imposed,174
assert the importance of public enforcement of securities laws. More
recent indices distinguish between ex ante and ex post interventions
by public and private actors.175
However, the full range of mechanisms employed to secure
compliance may be larger still.176 On the one hand, “public
enforcement” may encompass a range of sanctions beyond formal
penalties, including reputational sanctions imposed through public
censure.177 On the other hand, “gatekeeper control”178 is also a
widely used enforcement mechanism, but is not coded in the existing
law and finance literature. In particular, a specific type of gatekeeper,
the notary, is widely used in civilian, but not in common law, legal
systems. The notary charges a fee for verifying the propriety of
documentation associated with a range of transactions.179 In some
respects, this function is similar to that which might be performed by
legal advisers in a common law system. The difference is that referral
to a notary is mandatory, and the level of service is centrally
prescribed, whereas consultation with a lawyer is voluntary, and can
be metered by the client according to the amount at stake. It is
plausible that reliance on notaries and other gatekeeper mechanisms

172. La Porta et al., 2006, supra note 13.
173. Howell E. Jackson & Mark J. Roe, Public and Private Enforcement of Securities
Laws: Resource-Based Evidence (Harvard Law & Econ. Discussion Paper No. 638, 2008).
174. John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement, 156 U. PA. L.
REV. 229 (2007).
175. See generally La Porta et al., 2008, supra note 2.
176. See John Armour, Enforcement Strategies in UK Corporate Governance: A Road Map
and Empirical Assessment, in RATIONALITY IN COMPANY LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF D.D.
PRENTICE 71 (John Armour & Jennifer Payne eds., 2009).
177. See, e.g., Benjamin L. Liebman & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Reputational Sanctions in
China’s Securities Market, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 929 (2008).
178. Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement
Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53 (1986); JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE
PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2006).
179. Benito Arruñada, The Economics of Notaries, 3 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 5 (1996).
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associated with formalities might have a significant impact on the
efficacy of legal institutions.180
An additional factor that should be considered when seeking to
quantify enforcement intensity is that there is probably some
substitution between aspects of investor protection law and
enforcement mechanisms. In particular, shareholder governance
rights—decision-making rights and powers to appoint and remove
the board—are potentially effective substitutes for enforcement of
directors’ duties under corporate law, depending on the
coordination costs experienced by the shareholders.181 Consequently,
measuring enforcement intensity in isolation from substantive legal
rules may generate results just as potentially misleading as studies
based solely on the formal rules.
Not only do enforcement strategies present an additional channel
through which legal institutions may affect the real economy, they
might also be the source of some path dependencies in the content
of legal rules. Consider first the potential substitutability of certain
types of substantive rules and enforcement mechanisms. Where such
substitution is possible, this creates a barrier to change in the formal
rules. To implement such a change may require not only a change in
the formal rules, but also the development of an alternative
enforcement mechanism.
Secondly, consider the role accorded to gatekeepers such as
notaries in many legal systems. They constitute an interest group,
internal to the legal system, which is likely to have a bias against
change. Changes to the rules devalue the human capital of all
professionals specific to a particular set of transactional rules and
require a further investment in rule-specific human capital. For those
whose services are metered (such as business lawyers), these costs can
be offset by increased demand for legal services following a change in
the law, as clients also need to learn what is involved. For those
whose services are not metered, but who operate based on fixed
transaction fees (as is the case for notary services in many countries),
the change is simply uncompensated. This evolution may create an
additional source of path dependence for legal systems heavily reliant
on notaries as gatekeepers.

180. One might also expect the organization and training of these professions to be
relevant variables. See Hadfield, supra note 161.
181. Armour, supra note 176, at 102–09.

1495

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2/26/2010 1:14 PM

2009

3. Shared property rights
All systems of corporate law involve some partitioning of the
rights of ownership to assets between different classes of investors.182
The property rights in these assets (be they physical or financial) are
therefore shared between the participants.183 Such sharing
presupposes some mechanism for dealing with the problem of
“ostensible ownership” where one of the shared owners deals with a
third party on the basis that they are sole owner. In this case, either
the other shared owners, or the third party, loses out. Legal systems
have three basic mechanisms for dealing with this problem: (a) the
numerus clausus principle; (b) selective enforcement or negotiability;
and (c) registration.
The numerus clausus approach posits a fixed set of arrangements
for sharing property rights. By limiting the set, third parties may be
confident that they can limit their due diligence endeavors to
inquiries focused on this particular list.184 Alternatively, selective
enforcement involves ex post adjudication by a court as to which of
the “passive” owners or the third party could have avoided the
problem at least cost, e.g., by the passive owners doing more to
publicize their interest, or the third party making greater inquiries.185
Lastly, registration mechanisms provide an authoritative repository of
information about the nature of passive ownership interests.186
The three mechanisms are functional substitutes in the resolution
of the problem of ostensible ownership: any one of the three is
capable of reducing the costs thereby incurred to a manageable level.
However, they have quite different dynamic properties. The numerus
clausus approach, in particular, makes it very costly to introduce new
ways of sharing property rights, other than those on the existing list.
All transacting parties need to add to their list of potential questions
if a new entrant is added. In contrast, selective enforcement imposes
few additional costs for third parties if a new property-sharing
182. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 148.
183. Armour & Whincop, supra note 148.
184. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000).
185. John Armour & Michael J. Whincop, An Economic Analysis of Shared Property in
Partnership and Close Corporations Law, 26 J. CORP. L. 983 (2001).
186. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verification: The
Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 373, 393–95
(2001).
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arrangement is introduced: the more unusual the arrangement, the
more effort the passive owners must undertake to bring it to others’
attention. Registration lies somewhere between these poles,
depending on how the mechanism is implemented.187
Numerus clausus approaches have traditionally been associated
with civil law systems; selective enforcement mechanisms (through
the doctrines of “bona fide purchaser” and “constructive notice”)
have been linked with the equitable jurisdiction present in common
law systems. This duality, therefore, constitutes a plausible channel
through which path dependencies in the content of legal rules might
operate. In particular, this could help to explain the relative lack of
contractual protections for creditors in French civil law jurisdictions,
which rely on the numerus clausus approach.
C. Are Legal Origins “Endogenous”?
Summing up this part of our discussion, we have seen that a
focus on “infrastructural” aspects of legal systems can help in
explaining some of the mechanisms of legal dependency. A first point
to note is that these mechanisms do not always map very well onto
the civil law-common law divide. This mode of lawmaking (judicial
versus statutory), although often referred to in the legal origins
literature, is not a convincing explanation for divergences in
corporate law, given the predominant role played by statute, and the
correspondingly interstitial role of the courts, in all jurisdictions.
There is more scope for viewing difference in enforcement strategies
and modes of interpretation along legal origin lines. However, we
need more information to be sure that the classification of systems by
reference to legal “families” is the right approach to take. We also
need to carry out a mapping exercise so we have an objective basis
for differentiating between the “infrastructural” aspects of different
systems. Once that is done, we may have a firmer basis for
determining whether the legal families classification is a useful one.
Second, a closer identification of the factors that might be
driving legal path dependencies will assist us in assessing how far
legal systems can be said to be “exogenous” or “endogenous” with
regard to economic development. A possible working hypothesis
would be that differences in enforcement strategies (public versus
187. See John Armour, The Law and Economics Debate About Secured Lending: Lessons for
European Lawmaking?, 5 E UR . C OMPANY & FIN . L. R EV . 3, 25–28 (2008).
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private) and modes of interpretation (open-ended legal categories
versus the numerus clausus approach) could have an impact on the
extent to which the legal system supports transactional flexibility and
hence financial innovation. Possible tradeoffs between granting
transactional flexibility and protecting third party interests have also
been noted. If institutional factors such as these have implications for
the nature and extent of financial development independent of the
operation of formal legal rules, we may have part of the explanation
for the limited impact of formal convergence in shareholder
protection over the past decade. But if legal infrastructure is linked
to economic outcomes in this way, it is also likely that there will have
been some matching of legal institutions to economic and political
structures over time in the systems concerned. It would, for example,
be in the interests of particular interest groups to lobby to defend
certain enforcement strategies against changes that would leave them
worse off. Causal relations may therefore run in both directions.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
For the past decade or so, legal reforms worldwide have followed
a consistent pattern. Shareholder rights and corporate governance
standards have been strengthened in the belief that this would lead
to more dispersed share ownership and more liquid capital markets,
and creditor rights have been enhanced with a view to fostering
flows of private credit. The legal origins hypothesis provided at least
one theoretical underpinning for these developments by claiming
that legal systems affect long-run patterns of economic development.
Systems with a common law origin were thought to favor marketfacilitating laws, whereas those with roots in the French or German
civil law were seen as tending towards an activist role for the state.
These underlying differences of regulatory style were, it was argued,
reflected in the contents of the laws governing the business
enterprise and in economic outcomes. As applied by the World Bank
through its Doing Business reports, this approach directly influenced
policy initiatives in dozens of countries.
Despite its influence, unanswered questions remain relating to
the legal origins hypothesis. At a theoretical level, the theory lacks
clarity concerning the channels through which legal origins might
impact the substance of legal rules and economic outcomes. From an
empirical viewpoint, the claim suffers from a serious shortcoming in
that the evidence for the legal origins effect rests on quantitative
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indicators that offer a cross-sectional view of the law (mostly of the
content of laws as they were in the late 1990s). The findings from
these studies can only be valid if it is assumed that laws change
relatively little and that the ranking order of countries, in terms of
the impact of regulation on business, does not change much over
time. These issues can be tested empirically. We set out to develop
longitudinal datasets that could be used to throw light on the nature
and extent of changes to the substantive law and to assess their
relationship to legal origins, on the one hand, and to financial
development on the other.
We have now produced a number of new datasets tracking legal
change over time in the areas of shareholder protection and creditor
protection. Our indices include sixty indicators that code for the law
of five significant countries (France, Germany, India, the UK ,and
the U.S.) for the thirty-six year period between 1970 and 2005, and
reduced-form indices of ten indicators, which code for the laws in a
wider sample, twenty-five countries, for the period between 1995
and 2005. The coding methods we have used incorporate a wider
range of legal and regulatory variables than earlier studies and take
into account the different ways in which regulatory rules can be
expressed (as mandatory rules or as “defaults” applying in the
absence of contrary agreement). We have used time-series and panel
data econometric analysis to test for correlations between the
changing state of the law over time and economic outcome variables.
Our datasets provide a different picture of the state of the law
than that provided by the early legal origins papers. We see
considerable change in the area of shareholder protection, with civil
law systems catching up with their common law counterparts, in
particular over the decade leading up to 2005. This suggests that
lock-in through legal origin has not been much of an obstacle to the
formal convergence of systems. In the case of creditor protection, we
do not see a clear common law-civil law divide, but we do find
evidence to support a classification of systems by legal “families”;
German-origin systems have consistently higher scores, with Englishorigin ones in the middle and French-origins systems showing
generally low levels of support for creditor rights.
What about the impact of legal change? The econometric
findings we have reviewed here call into question the widespread
assumption that enhancing shareholders’ rights has positive
economic effects. We find that increases in shareholder protection
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have not led to greater stock market development, as might have
been expected. For some key variables, the relationship between legal
change and financial development is negative. One possible
interpretation of our results is that a “one size fits all” approach to
corporate governance reforms, stressing elements of British and
American practice—the role of independent boards and the market
for corporate control—may not be working as intended in civilian
and developing systems. Another interpretation is that even in the
common law world, shareholder protection can have
counterproductive effects, by unnecessarily raising the costs
associated with a stock exchange listing.
A theoretical implication of our work is that legal systems are not
the independent, “exogenous” force that legal origins theory takes
them to be. Legal systems are, to some degree, “endogenous” in the
sense of being shaped by their economic and political environment.
We should expect to see feedback effects not simply between
economic and political variables and the content of legal rules, but
also between these contextual factors and the “infrastructural” core
of legal systems.
The empirical analysis of legal origins is still, in significant
respects, a work in progress. The research project initiated just over a
decade ago by LLSV shows no sign of running out of steam. On the
contrary, with new techniques being deployed and an active
theoretical debate going on, it is continuing to progress. Time-series
evidence has enhanced our understanding of the legal origins
hypothesis, clarifying some claims with which it is associated while
undermining others, but we are still some way from fully
understanding the forces at work in the law-economy relation.
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